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A b s tra c t
This thesis examines the extent to which one can model, 
com putationally, some of the ideas expressed in a specific 
jurisprudentia l theory of judicial legal reasoning; that of Neil
MacCormick. To introduce the work I explain, in chapter 1, the 
reasons for undertaking it, and justify the choice of legal theory.
In chapter 2 I rehearse MacCorm ick’s example of deductive 
justification in a clear case (i.e. one in which there is no, or very 
little, judicial discretion available) in order to show that rule based
reasoning can be used to model the way in which he claims some
cases are deductively resolved. I then suggest some simple 
hypothetical variations of the factual scenario which is the subject 
of that example, in order to show how easily a user’s responses to a 
rule based system’s queries can become uncertain. I propose the use 
of what I term generic factual rules, as a means to increase a user’s 
confidence in his responses, and the usefulness of the advice a rule 
based system can provide. Then, in chapter 3, I examine a case based 
reasoning approach to a different aspect of this problem of user
uncertainty. Case based reasoning attempts to emulate reasoning by 
analogy, which MacCormick, as well as many other theorists, 
acknowledges as a central part of legal reasoning.
In chapter 4 I discuss how MacCormick claims judges resolve a 
dispute when deductive reasoning, and reasoning by analogy, prove 
inadequate for the task, i.e. when ‘hard’ cases arise. This involves 
appealing to legal principles, and I discuss the possibility of 
identifying such principles, particu larly previously unarticulated 
ones, for the purpose of incorporating them into an expert system. I 
find support for the claim that principles can be framed by a domain 
expert, in a manner which parallels the way in which MacCormick 
claims judges formulate them, in the work of J C Smith. I discuss the 
process by which, according to MacCormick, judges decide whether or 
not to support a proposed principle, and suggest that it is valid to 
propose that an expert should try to anticipate their assessments. I 
conclude chapter 4 by noting that the expert’s appraisal of these 
judicial deliberations, and other matters, would need to be expressed 
in certainty factors attached to each principle he proposed.
In chapter 5 I examine the extent to which a major part of the
principle formulation task which MacCormick identifies, that of 
reconciling a proposed principle with those domain cases which are 
arguably subsumed by it, can be performed using artific ia l 
intelligence techniques. I propose the use of a distinct (from the 
expert system) ‘principle-cases reconciliation system’, which would 
be used by the domain expert, for this reconciliation task, and at the 
end of the chapter I compare the concept of a principle with that of 
the generic factual rule discussed in chapter 2.
In chapter 6 I discuss the representation and use in the expert system 
of the principles produced from the reconciliation process. Also in 
this chapter I discuss the representation and use of domain cases, 
used by both the principle-cases reconciliation system and the expert 
system, and the possibility of the expert system user, rather than the 
domain expert himself, formulating principles. In chapter 7 I note 
how the user would supply the expert system with the details of his 
problem, and discuss the problem of grain size which any 
computational representation of the facts of a case must face.
In chapter .8 I bring together the main points made in the proceeding 
chapters in order to outline how an expert system, rooted in 
MacCormick’s theory, could be built, and how it would function. To 
conclude I summarise, in chapter 9, the extent to which MacCormick’s 
ideas can be computationally expressed, as revealed by the thesis, 
and suggest that principles, which are central to his theory, are 
essential for all future expert systems in law.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The purpose of this work is to examine the extent to which one can 
model, computationally, part of a jurisprudential theory of judicial 
legal reasoning. There has been much work recently on modelling 
aspects of legal argumentation, however, to my knowledge, nobody 
has yet attempted to apply this work to a specific jurisprudential 
theory.
This is not surprising as there is still much debate amongst legal 
theorists as to what, if any, are the logical thought processes 
underlying and influencing the way judges reach decisions, and 
whether these can be articulated. However, I do not believe this 
should dissuade one from attempting to model any well received 
theory which does appear amenable to some degree of computational 
representation. One benefit of such an exercise would hopefully be 
that it would be easier to evaluate such an ‘animated’ theory, by 
testing it on real decided cases, as well as specifically constructed 
hypothetical cases. Also, if found to have some predictive value, the 
model could serve as a useful tool for lawyers, and perhaps take us a 
step nearer to the widespread use of expert systems in law, the 
potential benefits of which have been well documented. (For example, 
making specialised advice, available to many people, at low cost.1)
For the above reasons I believe the ensuing examination should be of 
interest to lawyers, in spite of the obvious objection which can be 
levelled against its objective, from the point of view of legal theory, 
as well as to computer scientists.
I will discuss how one might use current artificial intelligence (Al) 
techniques, particularly those developed in the work on modelling 
legal argument, and some proposed techniques of my own, to attempt 
to build a model of one particular jurisprudential theory of how 
judges decide cases. I will also suggest how one should handle those 
aspects of the theory which cannot be computationally simulated.
1 Berman, D. H. & Hafner, C. D. The Potential of Artificial Intelligence to Help Solve the 
Crisis in Our Legal System. Commun. ACM. Aug. 1989, Vol.32, No.8, pp. 928, 932-3, 937
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The theory selected is that presented by Neil MacCormick in his book 
‘Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory’. It was chosen for the following 
reasons. It is a well respected treatise. It’s author is a contemporary 
leading jurisprudent, and so is able to comment on this work should 
he choose to do so. He is very interested in, and actively contributes 
to, research in Al and law, and so would hopefully be available for 
consultation should a model actually be built.
The theory describes certain features of legal argumentation which 
the author claims are operative in certain legal systems, specifically 
those of the common law tradition, and explains why he believes they 
ought to be fundamental features of such argumentation. It is thus 
presented as being both descriptive of operative norms, and as being 
normative in its own right.2 The author draws his example from 
Scottish and English law, and claims that his theory is descriptive of 
judicial legal reasoning in general in the Scottish and English legal 
systems, not just in the domains from which illustrative examples 
are drawn. Thus if a model is developed, and performs satisfactorily, 
it would constitute a significant contribution towards the creation of 
a generally applicable expert system shell.
The theory belongs to the positivist school of jurisprudence. In brief, 
the central tenets of positivism are as follows.3 Legal rules, found 
primarily in statutes and cases, are sufficient for the (deductive) 
resolution of some cases, called ‘clear cases’. However there are gaps 
in the rules. Thus other cases, ‘hard cases’, arise, which the rules do 
not cover, or in which the application of the rules is unclear, and such 
cases require the exercise of judicial discretion for their resolution.
The fact that MacCormick’s theory is positiv istic in nature is 
conducive to the goal of describing how a practically useful model 
based on his theory might be developed, for the following reasons. 
Firstly, because legal positivism is the theory of legal reasoning 
most w idely accepted today, at least by practising lawyers in 
common law ju risd ictions.4 Even if there are opposing schools of 
thought regarding how law works in theory (the arch exponent of 
which is Dworkin), it is the positiv ist school (most closely
2 LRLT, M 3
3 a) Gordon, T. F. An abductive theory of legal issues. IJMMS-2, p. 96 
b) ref. 2, p. 100
4 ref. 3a, p. 96
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associated with Hart), which seems best to accord with practice.5
Secondly, because most of the computational work from which I will 
draw (i.e. that on modelling legal argument), is grounded in a 
positivist philosophy. It might also be noted that most of this source 
work, though applicable to both civilian and common law systems, 
has been developed with the common law tradition primarily in mind, 
and MacCormick’s examination is of the common law method of 
judging.6
It must be stated that my work in no way claims to be an up to date 
reflection on MacCormick’s views on legal reasoning (although the 
author has assured me that such modification as his thinking has 
undergone does not amount to a radical abandonment of the ideas 
expressed in his book). The aim of my work is not to synthesise the 
writings on legal reasoning of a particular theorist, but to see how 
well one can model a cogent, coherent and complete theory of judicial 
legal reasoning (even if it no longer totally reflects its author’s 
thoughts).
5 Sergot, M. The representation of law in computer programs: A Survey and Comparison,
in: Knowledge Based Systems and Legal Applications, Bench-Capon, Ed.
Chapter 2
Deductive Reasoning
2.1 Introduction
A large part of MacCormick’s theory is concerned with explaining how 
judges reason when they clearly have discretion in the resolution of a 
dispute (he claims that from an examination of the case law one can 
identify factors that influence the exercise of that discretion, and 
how they influence it). However, before commencing his examination 
of judicial reasoning in such hard cases (where such clear discretion 
is involved), MacCormick asserts, in Chapter 2 of his book, that the 
justification of a legal decision can be (and sometimes is) purely 
deductive in nature. He illustrates this assertion by showing how the 
decision by Lewis J., in Daniels and Daniels v. R. White & Sons and 
Tarbard ([1938] 4 All E. R. 258), could be deductively justified using- 
clear rules of law expressed in statutes and cases. This deductive 
account can be computationally expressed simply using rule based 
reasoning (RBR), which I will do shortly. This will demonstrate that 
this first part of MacCormick’s theory is amenable to computational 
simulation. However, given a slight variation of the facts of Daniels, 
matters of uncertainty (and consequently judicial discretion) arise, 
with which basic RBR is inadequate to deal. This reflects the reality 
that deductive reasoning, using clear rules of statute and case law, is 
often inadequate to deal with a legal problem. I will suggest some 
techniques which would allow an expert system to continue making 
sound inferences, and providing useful advice, when simple deductive 
reasoning (implemented by RBR) faces such problems.
2.2 Rule Based Reasoning
To set the context, a summary of the facts of Daniels, and the area of 
law it involved, is required. The facts of Daniels are, briefly, as 
fo llo w s .
Mr. Daniels went into Mrs. Tarbard’s pub and said ‘ I want a bottle of R. 
White’s lemonade’, and was sold one. He took the bottle home where
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he and his wife drank some of the lemonade. They both experienced 
burning sensations and became ill. The cause of their sickness was 
subsequently established as being the fact that the lemonade which 
they had consumed was heavily contaminated with carbolic acid. 
Examination of the remaining contents of the lemonade bottle showed 
the lemonade contained a large admixture of carbolic acid.
The p la in tiffs , Mr. and Mrs. Daniels, subsequently sued the 
manufacturer of the lemonade bottle, and the publican who sold it to 
them, for damages in compensation for the ir illness, treatment 
expenses, and loss of earnings when ill. The manufacturer was 
absolved from liability, the publican was held liable and ordered to 
pay damages.7
The law relevant to the successful action concerned the contractual 
relationship between a seller and a purchaser; specifically, the 
implied condition imposed on the seller in a sale by description (by 
the Sale of Goods Act 1893 s.14(2)) that the goods shall be of 
merchantable quality. Breach of this condition was the ground on 
which the liability of the second defender, the publican Tarbard, was 
established.
I will now suggest how one might develop the rule based part of an 
expert system whose purpose was to advise on breach of the implied 
contractual condition just noted. RBR on this module would be 
sufficient to handle a case like Daniels in the deductive manner 
MacCormick8 describes. The knowledge represented would be 
statutory rules, and ‘rules’ derived from cases. The sources of these 
would be primary and secondary sources, and expert opinion.
As proposed by Susskind, individuation of the rules, or ‘ legal 
productions’ , and building the rules knowledge base (RKB), would be 
primarily a task for the legally trained knowledge engineer; he would 
immerse himself in the sources and require minimal help from the 
expert until tuning the system.9 Thus from the 1893 Act the 
knowledge engineer would select the following sections. Section 
1(1), establishing the criteria for a ‘contract of sale’, i.e., that if one 
party transfers the property in goods to another for a money
' LRLT, pp. 19-20
8 ref. 7, pp. 30-2
9 ESL, pp. 59-60
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consideration then a contract of sale exists between those parties. 
(‘Property’ in goods means the right to posses, use, and dispose of 
those goods.) Section 14(2), imposing on the contract, where the sale 
is a sale by description, and the seller is a person who deals in goods 
of that description, the implied condition that the goods shall be of 
merchantable quality. Sections 11(1 )(a), and 53(1) and (2), stating 
the buyer’s right to recover damages from the seller if he (the seller) 
breaks a condition of the contract.
These provisions can clearly be re-expressed in the prepositional 
form required of a rule based system (as in fact MacCormick’s outline 
on pages 30-31 of his book clearly shows), and this would be a 
straightforward task. For example -
J j a person (the seller) transfers property in goods and another (the 
buyer) pays money then there is a contract of sale. SGA s.1(1)
JJ there is a sale by description and the seller deals in goods of that 
description then there is an implied condition that the goods shall be 
of merchantable quality. SGA s. 14(2)
L f there is an implied condition that the goods shall be of 
merchantable quality and they are unmerchantable then there is ' a 
breach of contract (the buyer is entitled to damages).
Furthermore, through his examination of leading cases in the domain, 
and commentary on them, the knowledge engineer would identify case 
rules, express or implicit, which supplement the statutory rules. In 
effect this is what MacCormick does when he suggests,10 that the 
proposition - If a contract of sale exists between buyer and seller, 
and if the goods in question are a form of bottled drink, and if the 
buyer requests and receives a certain named beverage, then the goods 
are sold by description - is implicit, though not expressly stated, in 
Morelli v. Fitch & Gibbons ([1928] 2 K.B. 636). In that case the 
plaintiff specifically requested a bottle of Stone’s ginger wine, and 
this was held to constitute a sale by description.
Susskind provides jurisprudential support for the idea of deriving 
rules from cases, he calls them ‘case law-statements’ ,11 and concrete 
evidence of the feasibility of identifying implicit case rules can be 
seen in, for example, the CABARET12 project. One should not be too
10 LRLT, p. 30
11 ESL, pp. 84-90
12 Rissland, E. R. & Skalak, D. B. CABARET: rule interpretation in a hybrid architecture 
IJMMS-1, pp. 863, 865
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ambitious in trying to divine rules from cases; Deedman for one 
warns against trying to extract rules from case decisions, when 
there are simply none present, purely in an effort to make the case 
suitable for computer manipulation.13 However, simply identifying 
specific groups of facts which clearly seem to satisfy a particular 
statutory term, and thereby articulating implicit rules, as in Morelli, 
or the CABARET project; and identifying express propositions of law 
which were clearly intended to clarify such terms, for example, Lord 
Wright’s proposition in Grant v. Australian Knitting Mills ([1936] A.C. 
85 at p. 100), that a thing ‘is not merchantable ... if it has defects 
unfitting it for its only proper use but not apparent on ordinary 
exam ina tion ’, would not seem to involve reading anything 
unwarranted into the case law.
These statutory rules, and case derived rules, would form a RKB, 
implemented as a standard decision tree. See Figure 1. RBR on this 
module would follow the conventional practice of querying the user 
about satisfaction of terminal node conditions, and forward chaining 
when possible towards the goal.
n Deedman, C. Exposing some Myths about Law and dispelling some Myths about 
Computers. (paper) pp. 3-4
damages for 
breach of contract
implied condition of 
merchantable quality
unmerchantable
sale by 
description
seller deals in goods 
of that description
defects unfitting thing not apparent on
for its only proper use ordinary examination
( Grant v AKM per Lord Wright)
contract of sale goods are a buyer requests and
between buyer and seller bottled drink receives a named beverage 
( Morreli v Fitch & Gibbons )
person (seller) transfers 
property in goods
another person 
(buyer) pays money
Figure 1. Decision Tree.
However, it is always possible for the authority of a rule derived 
from a case to be questioned. Thus a conclusion which resulted from 
inferencing which at any stage employed a case derived rule should be 
qualified. This qualification could simply be a statement of the 
values of the factors which a lawyer must consider, or weigh, when 
assessing the authority of a case (e.g. its age, jurisdiction in which it 
was decided, hierarchical position of the court which decided it; and 
maybe also size of the majority (if an appellate case), and comments 
on the decision in subsequent important cases). The lawyer would 
then have to assess the strength of the system’s findings himself, 
given such information for each case derived rule the system used.
8
Additionally, the expert system might incorporate some numerical 
weighting of the authority of a case rule, given the different values 
of these factors, in order to compute a certainty for its (the 
system’s) final conclusion. It has been commented that numerical 
quantification of matters relating to the certainty of an outcome is 
not something that lawyers are comfortable with. On the other hand 
others claim that ‘Lawyers are accustomed to talking about a cases’s 
chances of success or failure in percentage terms among themselves 
and to clients’14. Which view is true may, of course, depend on the 
lawyer concerned, however, at least one reported research project, 
the Malicious Prosecution Consultant, has successfully developed a 
scheme for weighting precedents according to age, hierarchical 
position, and ju risd iction .15 Admittedly the purpose was to allow 
comparative assessment of the strength of cases for the purpose of 
case based reasoning, rather than to assess objectively the strength 
of any one case, but the case weights could be converted to certainty 
factors. Testing of the Malicious Prosecution Consultant on decided 
cases produced good results, so the weighting scheme would appear 
to have performed satisfactorily for its intended purpose. Whether a 
set of certainty factors could be derived from such a weighting 
scheme, which would produce a useful indication of the certainty of 
the system’s goal being satisfied (particularly when more than one 
case rule, and therefore more than one certainty factor, was involved, 
and so some mechanism for combining them became necessary), could 
only be revealed by comparing the certainty factors produced from 
test runs with expert assessments of certainty.
Above I cited one case derived rule which could be used to expand on a 
statutory term. However, it would not be enough for the legally 
trained knowledge engineer to identify one such clear (explicit or 
implicit) case rule for a particular term; he would (obviously) have to 
identify all such rules, because he would not know which would be 
relevant to a new problem or fact situation (NFS). For example, 
another case rule might have involved a car sold by make and model. 
Thus statutory rules would form the core of the decision tree, and 
each case rule would be encoded as an alternative condition branch 
from the particular statutory term which it defined, thereby 
providing specific example clarifications of it. Together these two
n Deedman, C. & Smith J. C. The Nervous Shock Advisor: A Legal Expert System in Case- 
based Law. (paper) p. 13
15 Kowalski, A. Case Based Reasoning and the Deep Structure Approach to Knowledge 
Representation. ICAIL-91, pp. 21-30
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types of rule would constitute the essence of the RKB.
However, case derived rules, theoretically at least, merely provide an 
illustration of some of the ways in which the terms to which they 
relate may be satisfied, not a complete set of definitions and 
examples. Thus it might be argued that for each such term a final 
alternative branch should allow the user to treat the term as 
satisfied, even though his NFS does not match any of the case rule 
branches. Any findings of the system relying on this branch would be 
qualified by the reminder that there was no authority for holding the 
term satisfied, given the fact situation, and that the user himself 
would have to find an argument for extending the term to cover his 
particular facts.
Two points need to be made to qualify this simple idea of a set of 
alternative case rules offering possible ways to satisfy a particular 
statutory term, followed by a final alternative permitting the user to 
treat the term as satisfied irrespective of these rules.
Firstly, if the expert system failed to fire any of the case derived 
rules, and it contained a case based reasoning module, as discussed 
later, then that reasoner could be invoked and may retrieve relevant 
precedents which could be used to support an argument that the NFS 
satisfied the term. These cases would be identified by looking for 
close, (as well as just exact), matches between precedents and the 
NFS. An attempt to satisfy the term in this way would be made before 
allowing the user to resort to the ‘unsupported speculation’ final 
alternative in the RKB, as an authority supported argument that the 
term is satisfied would obviously be preferable to the user simply 
making such an unsupported speculation.
Secondly, even if the case derived rules, and case based reasoning 
(CBR), failed to satisfy, or at least arguably satisfy, the term, the 
provision of a final alternative triggering rule, which simply allowed 
the user to speculate that his NFS satisfied the term, is, though 
theoretically justifiable, practically questionable, for the following 
reason.
When a term is contained in an old statute, and has already been the 
focus of many cases attempting to apply it to various factual 
situations, it is likely that judges will regard its range of 
application as fairly settled (i.e. inflexible) and so it is unlikely that
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they w ill extend its application to a scenario which has no 
resemblance whatsoever to decided cases. (I say ‘whatsoever’ 
because CBR would already have identified partial resemblances.)
Thus in such situations a final ‘unsupported speculation’ alternative 
would be almost bound to be redundant, so from a practical point of 
view it might be argued that it should be omitted, or at least the user 
strongly advised against its use, as it would allow (and by the fact of 
its presence perhaps even tempt), the user to make a speculation 
which, in reality, a judge would almost never allow. On the other 
hand, where the term involved was from a recent statute, on which 
there was little case law, the inclusion of the alternative would 
seem less contentious.
2.3 Generic Factual Rules
It was demonstrated in the previous section, that it is possible to 
derive rules from cases which give examples of, or definitions of, a 
statutory term. Given that actual case examples are often indicative 
of types of situations or facts that judges regard as satisfying 
particular terms, it is submitted that efforts should be made to 
knowledge engineer generic factual rules (GFRs) from particular case 
rules/examples. Such a GFR, for a particular case rule, would employ 
broader factual terms that those present in the case rule, and these 
might subsume the facts of the NFS when it failed to match the facts 
present in the case rule.
To illustrate this idea I return to the M o re lli case. I have already
described the specificity of the case rule example of ‘sale by
descrip tion ’ which MacCormick found im plic it in M ore lli. The 
generation of a GFR from that case rule might simply involve
generalising from the terms ‘bottled drink’ and ‘beverage’ to ‘sealed 
item of sustenance’, or, more generally still, simply ‘consumable’ . 
Then, if the user’s facts failed to match the actual fact ‘bottled 
drink ’ , but did satisfy the more general term ‘sealed item of 
sustenance’ (e.g. suppose a tin of soup was involved), and assuming 
all other conditions in the case rule were satisfied, a qualified
satisfaction of the conclusion of the rule would result.
It might be qualified in two senses. Firstly, in the sense that the user 
would be reminded that satisfaction of the conclusion of this rule
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was based, partly at least, on a knowledge engineered projection 
from an actual case fact to a generic category. This reminding would 
take the form of a message presented when the satisfaction of the 
conclusion in this manner actually occurred, and also in the 
qualifications attached to the final output. Thus, if the output was an 
explanation of how the system reached its final conclusion, and the 
user decided to use the inferences it made when presenting his case, 
he would know from the qualification of the M o re lli rule conclusion 
that he would have to argue that ‘bottled drink’ , and ‘tin of soup’, are 
of the same genus, and so the rule should apply.
Secondly, in the sense that a certainty or generality factor (GF) might 
be associated with the term (or category) ‘sealed item of 
sustenance’, which would affect the case rule’s conclusion in the 
following way. The GF would modify the certainty of the condition 
containing the case fact to which the generic term related, in order 
that the certainty of the conclusion of the rule was lessened (even if 
only marginally), the more general the projected term was compared 
to the actual fact present in the case. More than one of the conditions 
in a rule might only be satisfiable by employing a generic term, so a 
suitable method for combining the certainty values of the conditions, 
to produce the value for the certainty of the rule’s conclusion, would 
need to be identified. (Propagation of such values throughout the RKB 
would of course determine the certainty of the rule based reasoner’s 
overall conclusion.) However, before that method for determining the 
certainty of a rule based reasoner’s advice could be employed, the 
values of the GFs themselves would need to be determined. On this 
matter it is worth noting that Susskind, in his proposal of ‘case law- 
generalisations’, which parallel my idea of GFRs, suggests that ‘their 
certainty factors may be drawn from secondary sources or from 
human experts’16.
The following discussion rests on the assumption that it would be 
possible to obtain GFs (either from an expert, or perhaps from a 
knowledge engineer’s examination of the secondary sources) in spite 
of the claim made by some that legal experts are unwilling to 
quantify matters of uncertainty numerically.
The simplest version of the GFR idea would require the domain expert 
to identify those general factual terms, or categories, which he 
thinks a particular fact in a case rule condition could fall under (e.g.
16 ESL, p7 l05
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‘house’ is definitely a type of ‘building’), and which he thinks the 
judiciary might be willing to regard the case rule as applying to (i.e. 
would they want the rule to apply to buildings in general, or just to a 
house). A GF would thus represent the likelihood of a case fact being 
accepted as merely indicative of a particular category, as far as the 
rule containing that fact was concerned. In other words GFs would be 
context (i.e. rule) sensitive, as the GF for a particular fact-category 
combination might differ from one rule to another. The task of
determ ining whether a particular fact is subsumable under a
particular category would hopefully not involve any semantic 
uncertainty (e.g. a ‘house’ is clearly a ‘building’), but if it did (e.g. is a 
‘scooter’ a ‘veh ic le ’), this would have to be an additional, 
preliminary, consideration of the expert when determining the GF.
If the user’s actual facts failed to match the case fact contained in a 
case rule condition, then he would be offered the opportunity to try to 
satisfy that condition by selecting one of the generic terms (or
categories) associated with the case fact. As noted, the certainty of 
the condition would be modified by the GF associated with the term 
selected. However, as the user himself might not be completely 
certain that the court would be willing to accept that his actual
facts (semantically) satisfied a particular category/term  offered 
(e.g. Is a ‘three walled shed’ a ‘building’?), he would perhaps be 
allowed to attach a certainty factor to his response. This would 
further qualify the certainty of the particular condition involved (and 
therefore that of the rule’s conclusion).
If the user was permitted to express his certainty, then, as the 
expert’s GF values would probably decrease the greater the distance 
between a case fact and its associated generic terms, while the 
user’s certainty would probably increase, and as this would probably 
be true of all the conditions in a case rule, the system would ideally 
allow the user to see resultant conclusion certainty values for a rule 
based on selecting various combinations of generic terms for its 
different (case rule) conditions before deciding on particular ones.
To summarise the main points above. The user would not be asked, or 
allowed, to assess the probability of the judge accepting a fact- 
category generalisation for a particu lar rule; th is would be 
exclusively an expert (or perhaps knowledge engineer) task. However, 
he might have to consider the issue of whether a NFS fact is 
(semantically) subsumable under a particular generic term, and
13
sem antic  uncerta in ty  m ight also be one of the expe rt’s 
considerations.
Figure 2. Relationship between the fact in a case rule condition (CF), 
a generic term (GT), and the actual fact (AF) in a NFS.
The expert’s generality factor, and user supplied certainty factor, 
would combine to produce a certainty value for the ‘bottled drink’ 
condition, which the GT would now replace.
The tasks of determining generic terms (or categories), and GFs, for a 
fact in a case rule condition, would ideally be done for each fact, in 
each case rule condition. Although these have been discussed mainly 
as expert tasks, it is arguable that even if an expert was available 
the first of these could satisfactorily be achieved, to a large extent, 
by the knowledge engineer. Consultation of the secondary sources, and 
examination of related domains, could provide the knowledge engineer 
with likely generalisation, including, perhaps, guidance on the 
semantic issue. The expert would then simply approve, or disapprove, 
the suggestions, and supply GFs. Each fact in a case rule could have a 
number of generic terms associated with it, and by offering these to 
the user the system would a llow  him to determ ine that 
generalisation of the case rule (i.e. that GFR), which was closest to 
his NFS and the case rule itself.
GT
('sealed item of sustenance')
userexpert 
de te rm in ed / 
subsumption
determined
\subsum ption
/^generality
factor certainty >  
factor ?
CF
('bottled drink')
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('tin of soup')
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2.4 Generic Factual Hierarchy
There are aspects of the GFR idea which one might question; here I 
will consider two. Firstly, there is a knowledge representation issue. 
Under the simple outline described, a fact in a particular rule 
condition might be associated with a number of generic terms. 
Furthermore, the same generic term could be related to the same fact 
in different rules, or several different facts in the same or different 
rules. Although these term-fact relationships could differ (e.g. a 
particular generic term might be the closest of two to one fact, and 
the most remote of two from another) and so could the associated 
GFs, would it be necessary to duplicate the generic terms themselves 
in the course of associating them with facts? Secondly, there is the 
issue of the user making certainty assessments. It would be better if 
the possibility of his feeling the need to do so could be reduced.
As an attempt to deal with these issues I propose that a hierarchy of 
domain facts, implemented as a semantic network, could be 
constructed. Facts further up the hierarchy would be generic in 
relation to those they subsumed, i.e., the facts would form a generic 
factual hierarchy (GFH). This idea can be found in various researchers’ 
w o rk ,17 but here I will discuss it in the context of Karl Branting’s 
recent work on his CBR system GREBE.
Branting uses a hierarchy to express semantic relationships between 
facts in his target domain of Texas worker’s compensation law. For 
example, ‘passenger’ has the generalisation ‘traveller’ , and ‘traveller’ 
has the specialisation ‘driver’ .18 Indeed GREBE’s semantic network is 
an extremely ambitious taxonomy of objects, from the most general 
‘thing’, through, for example, ‘tangible entity’, down to ‘food’, and so 
on; or through ‘ legal concept’ , down to ‘sub category’ or ‘ legal 
re la tion ’ or ‘ru le’ or ‘case’, with, for example, ‘ legal relation’ 
subsuming ‘employment’ , and ‘worker’s compensation liability’. Each 
object in the network is represented by a frame, in which (causal, 
temporal and intentional) relationships between it and other objects 
in the network can be explicitly represented.19 This hierarchy enables 
GREBE to perform its sophisticated form of CBR, which is discussed 
later. However, for my current purposes, a hierarchy simply relating 
the basic tangible entities, or facts, of the domain would suffice. In
17 e.g. That of L T McCarty, and that of Anne von der Lieth Gardner
10 Branting, L. K. Building Explanations from Rules and Structured Cases. IJMMS-1, p. 808
19 ref. 18, pp. 808-9
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the context of M orelli, the taxonomic relations, or, as Branting also 
calls them, semantic rules,20 which such a structure would support 
would be of the nature ‘bottled drink’ , has generalisation ‘sealed item 
of sustenance’, which has specialisation ‘tin of food’.
Branting states that ‘differing case terms can be matched if both are 
manifestations of the same abstract term, e.g., if both are symptoms 
caused by the same underlying physiological state or both have the 
same generalisation’ .21 This statement describes a practice of the 
court, whereby it will sometimes hold that the facts of the case it is 
considering satisfy a particular open textured phrase, and justify its 
holding by referring to a precedent in which the phrase was held 
satisfied by facts which were different from, but of the same type 
as, those at issue. For example, the court justified the assertion that 
food was ‘reasonably essential’ to ensure the proper performance of 
work duties in an instant case, by observing that iced water had been 
held to be reasonably essential in a precedent.22 Branting refers to 
this practice as ‘case elaboration’, and employs it (or at least 
instances of it), in GREBE’S form of CBR.
I have already proposed that the expert should suggest what 
generalisation might be permitted for a fact in the context of its 
rule. That proposal can be viewed as the first part of an attempt to 
anticipate this practice of the court. I now propose that the expert, 
or knowledge engineer, should also suggest hypothetical, or novel, 
specia lisations of generalisations which might arise. Such a 
hypothetical specialisation would be ‘tin of food’ in the simple 
example derived from M ore lli. This would complete the attempt to 
anticipate this court practice. Again a parallel with this idea can be 
found in Susskind’s work, where he suggests the use of ‘case law- 
derivations’ to supplement the RKB.23 Such specialisations, or 
derivations, would hopefully lessen the need for the user to attach 
certainty factors to his responses, as if his facts failed to match the 
fact contained in a case rule condition, the rule based reasoner would 
identify generic terms subsuming that fact, and offer him specific 
alternative specialisations of those terms, suggested by the expert, 
one of which would hopefully match his facts. Reducing the user’s
53 Branting, L. K. Reasoning with Portions of Precedents. ICAIL-91, p. 150
21 Branting, L. K. & Porter, B. W. Rules and Precedents as Complementary Warrants. 
(paper for AAAI-91) p. 3
22 ref. 21, pp. 3-4
23 ESL, p. 104
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desire to make certainty assessments was the second issue raised at 
the start of this section. The first was avoiding duplication of 
generic terms. A semantic network would achieve this in the
following way.
Each case rule condition would reference that part of the semantic 
network which contained the most specific generic term for its fact 
(that term would of course have a GF for that fact). This would allow 
the rule based reasoner to offer the user that term, and then each 
successive subsuming term which had a GF for the fact (plus those 
terms’ specialisations). Thus each generic term, and any associated 
information (e.g. authority for, or source of, the generalisation) 
would only need to be represented once, as references to the
semantic network, and links within it, would provide the means by
which the generic terms for each fact were identified.
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Chapter 3
Reasoning by Analogy
3.1 Introduction
I have suggested that GFRs, and a GFH, could be used to infer that a 
condition of a case derived rule is satisfied when the facts of a NFS 
do not match the case fact contained in that condition.This idea can 
be viewed as simulating one way of reasoning by analogy, i.e., 
drawing attention to the sim ilarity of specific facts in the instant 
case, and a precedent, in order to support a claim. I now wish to 
examine how CBR could be used to reason by analogy when there is 
doubt over whether the NFS satisfies an open textured legal phrase, 
or term, contained in a node of the basic decision tree.
The examination reveals a CBR approach to the question of what can 
be argued when the facts in a precedent, and those in the NFS, do not 
match exactly. The first part of the examination considers one 
particular way in which the facts may only partially match. The 
problem this part addresses is sim ilar to that which was being 
addressed when discussing GFRs, but the exact nature of the problem 
is different. Here the issue is not simply whether the mismatching 
facts can be subsumed under a particular term, but rather that they 
represent different degrees of that term.
3.2 Approximate Factual Match
Looking at the decision tree in Figure 1, one can see that two of the 
terminal nodes constitute the conditions of a general rule articulated 
by Lord Wright in Grant v. A.K.M.. (i.e. If a thing ‘has defects unfitting 
it for its only proper use’ and they are ‘not apparent on ordinary 
examination’ then it is ‘not merchantable’ .) Although given the facts 
of Daniels this dictum is clearly satisfied, both these terminal node 
antecedents are potentially open textured, and so actual case 
examples might assist the user in deciding if his NFS satisfied them. 
(Of course it should still be open to the user to decide that his NFS 
satisfied an antecedent phrase irrespective of any support from case
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examples.)
Regarding the first antecedent, a fact situation which satisfied it 
could be found in Grant itself, where the defective article was 
sulphite impregnated underpants, which caused dermatitis to the
wearer. The legally trained knowledge engineer could also look to 
M o re lli, in which unmerchantability was held, but which was decided 
before Lord Wright’s dictum, as an example of the sort of scenario 
which he intended it to cover. If we assume the new problem occurred 
after Daniels then it too could provide an example of what Lord 
Wright meant.
The expert or knowledge engineer would have to identify the critical 
facts in each of these cases. (This is, of course, a matter of 
interpretation; thus even if it seemed obvious that the facts 
identified were an example of the dictum, it would be possible for a 
court to deny it.) e.g. A foreign substance, in a bottle of drink, which 
causes sickness when consumed, is a defect unfitting the drink for 
its only proper use - Daniels. If a corked bottle breaks when an 
attempt is made to remove the cork, with a corkscrew, in the
ordinary way, then it has a defect unfitting it for its only proper use
- M orelli.
Obviously all three of these fact situations could be formed into case 
rules with conjunctive conditions. However, suppose the NFS only 
satisfied some of the condition facts of such a rule exactly; a lawyer 
might argue that the rule still applied by claiming that the other 
condition facts were merely instances of the matter to which their 
conditions related, and that the NFS also satisfied those conditions, 
although to a different degree. For example, suppose the NFS, like 
Daniels, involved a foreign substance in a bottled drink, but the 
foreign substance it contained was harmless, and its only affect was 
to alter the taste. The lawyer might claim that the p la intiff’s
enjoyment of the drink was diminished, as it was in Daniels, and so 
the first part of the dictum was satisfied, as enjoyment of a drink is 
part of its ‘only proper use’.
On the other hand, what if the altered taste was not unpleasant, just 
(slightly) different from what was expected. For example, if an 
energy giving drink was involved, an opposing lawyer could argue that 
its only proper use was to be drunk and give energy, not to be drunk 
and have its taste appreciated, its taste being irrelevant, as long as
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not unpleasant. He might concede that what Daniels was really about 
was a consumer being adversely affected by a defective drink, but say 
that it only covered adverse effects in the sense of a consumer being 
harmed by the drink. He would claim that Daniels did not go so far as 
to establish that a defect in a drink makes it unfit for its only proper 
use if that defect merely alters the drink’s taste, particularly if the 
altered taste was not unpleasant, and therefore argue that the first 
part of the dictum was not satisfied.
However, even if the altered taste was not unpleasant, the first
lawyer might argue that the NFS facts were still sufficiently close 
to Daniels to satisfy the claim ‘unfit for only proper use’ , albeit not 
as strongly as they would if sickness had resulted from consuming 
the drink. His argument would be to reassert that appreciation of the 
taste of a drink is part of its only proper use, even if not the main
reason for consuming it. (If one were to accept this view then what if
the defect did not alter the drink in any way. Would the knowledge of, 
or even mere presence of, a defect in a drink be enough to unfit that 
drink for its only proper use?)
3.3 ‘Factors’ and HYPO like Case Based Reasoning
The above hypothetical debate reflects the fact that lawyers may, in 
effect, accept that the fact of a particular case rule condition is 
merely an example of the matter which the condition is intended to 
cover, but argue over whether it justifies the assertion that the NFS 
also satisfies that condition. In order to model the arguments which 
may be advanced in such a debate it is submitted that, as well as 
deriving case rules, an expert, or knowledge engineer, should try to 
identify, from commentary and cases on such an open textured phrase 
as ‘unfit for only proper use’, a rule, or rules, which purport to 
define, or be relevant to the satisfaction of, that phrase, and whose 
conditions could contain terms which were more general than the 
exact facts of particular cases.
This idea is borrowed from, and its feasibility (at least for certain 
domains), has been demonstrated in, the HYPO,24 and CABARET,25
24 a) MLA
b) Ashley, K. D. Reasoning with cases and hypotheticals in HYPO. IJMMS-1, pp. 753-
796
25 Rissland, E. L. & Skalak, D. B. CABARET: rule interpretation in a hybrid architecture. 
IJMMS-1, pp. 839-887
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projects, although the term ‘factor’ is used rather than ‘rule’. I will 
adopt the term factor, and talk about its ‘elements’, rather than 
conditions, as these terms better convey the idea of a group of facts 
whose presence in a case can merely strengthen, or weaken, (i.e. be a 
plus factor for, or a minus factor against), the claim that a phrase is 
s a tis fie d ,26 rather than alone being determinative of the satisfaction, 
or non satisfaction, of that phrase. (Obviously this idea, of extracting 
from the domain sources, groups of elements which purportedly 
contribute to the satisfaction of, or non satisfaction of, an open 
textured term or phrase, parallels the construction of GFRs, 
discussed in the previous chapter, but there are differences, which 
will be introduced.)
Much of the rest of this chapter discusses how factors can be used to 
identify the arguments that a precedent can support in a NFS, and as 
the discussion borrows from, or derives from, Kevin Ashley’s 
observations when discussing his CBR system HYPO, I should first of 
all consider his comments on the task of actually identifying factors 
in the domain of trade secret law in which HYPO operates, and any 
implications the comments may have for the task of identifying 
factors in the domain I am considering, as unless factors can be 
identified the ensuing discussion will be purely academic.
Ashley observes that although the legal claims about whose 
satisfaction HYPO reasons contain open textured phrases, e.g. ‘trade 
secret’ , they are phrases on which there are many purported 
definitions in cases and treatises.27 From these purported definitions 
factors are extracted. However he does also discuss the possibility of 
extending HYPO to deal with more abstract legal phrases e.g. 
‘reasonable time’, or ‘ordinary care’, for which there might be less 
purported definitions, and the problems that might face. e.g. It might 
not be clear how a phrase is satisfied in a particular case (though it 
definitely is satisfied) so identifying the relevant facts will be a 
more subjective m atter of in te rpre ta tion .28 Factors would be 
identifiable for these more abstract phrases, though the task of 
identifying them might be harder, and they would be more 
con trovers ia l.
Thus, although the identification of factors might not be as
55 Ashley, K. D. Reasoning with cases and hypothetical in HYPO. IJMMS-1, p. 757
27 MLA, p. 239
28 ref. 27, pp. 238-241
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straightforward as it was for the open textured phrases HYPO reasons 
about in the domain of trade secret law, it is feasible to suggest that 
factors could be identified for ‘unfit for only proper use’ (which is 
not as abstract as some of the phrases Ashley comments on) like the 
one I will now suggest. (Regarding this factor I should note that it is 
purely my own speculation, my purpose being to discuss the 
usefulness of CBR as an approach to dealing with open texture, not to 
identify what factors are identifiable for any particular phrase.)
A factor which might have been extracted from Daniels and other 
cases could have contained two elements which were actual facts of 
Daniels , i.e. ‘bottled drink’, and ‘contains a foreign substance’ , and a 
third, denoting a more general category than the third actual fact of 
Daniels, could have been ‘adversely affects consumer’. In accordance 
with the HYPO model, the third element, unlike the first two, would 
not simply be a binary predicate, taking the value ‘yes’ or ‘no’ (and 
succeeding or failing totally), but would take a value from a range 
varying from, for example, ‘causes alteration of taste’, then ‘causes 
an unpleasant taste’ , through ‘causes severe illness’ , to ‘causes 
death’ .
To satisfy such a factor, a case would have to match one of the 
values for the variable element (as well as, of course, satisfying the 
other elements in the factor). If the NFS satisfied the elements of 
such a factor, then any precedent which also satisfied them could 
provide an argument that the open texture phrase at issue was 
satisfied, or was not satisfied, by the NFS, the strength of that 
argument depending on the (relative) values of the variable element 
that the precedent and the NFS contained.
If we consider the case of Daniels, which obviously satisfied the 
factor’s elements, and a NFS which also satisfied them, then we can 
see what arguments Daniels could support in the NFS, regarding the 
satisfaction of the open textured phrase ‘only proper use’, given the 
different ways in which the NFS might satisfy the variable element.
The first point to make is as follows. If both the facts of the NFS and 
those of the precedent (Daniels) satisfied the elements of the factor 
suggested, i.e. if it was present in both cases, then, irrespective of 
whether their values matched exactly, this would indicate a relevant 
similarity between the two cases. On the basis that like cases be 
treated alike, and before any other matters were taken into account,
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th is basic sim ilarity would constitute an in itia l argument that, 
regarding the phrase the factor concerned, the decision in the NFS 
should be the same as the precedent. Thus if, as suggested, the only 
difference between the NFS and Daniels was the way in which the 
foreign substance in the drink affected the consumer’s enjoyment, 
the plaintiff could argue that the drink in the NFS was unfit for its 
only proper use.
However, if the value of the third element of the factor was lower on 
the range in the NFS than in the precedent (e.g. if there was 
‘alteration of taste’ rather than ‘severe illness’), then the defender 
could claim that Daniels was distinguishable and should not be 
followed. Indeed he could claim that Daniels represented the 
minimum requirements needed for the phrase to be satisfied, and thus 
cite it in favour of the opposite outcome. This is an example of a 
discretionary issue, in which a judge must decide what effect the 
weaker value of an element of a factor in a NFS, compared to its 
value in a precedent, has on the support that factor lends to each side 
in the NFS. i.e. Is the element so weak in the NFS that the factor 
containing it no longer favours the side it did in the precedent? A 
case based reasoning system, such as HYPO, can not resolve this 
question, but it can identify, as a lawyer should, that because of the 
variable element’s differing values, the same case constitutes a 
potential argument for both sides.
If the third element had the same range value in the precedent and the 
NFS, then neither the distinguishing argument nor the stronger 
argument noted would be open to the defender. Moreover, if the range 
value was higher in the NFS than in Daniels (e.g. ‘death’) then the 
plaintiff could argue that the precedent’s result re the open textured 
phrase should be given a fortiori in the NFS, because the reason for 
that result (i.e. the presence of the factor) was even stronger in the 
NFS than in the precedent. A HYPO like case based reasoner would 
identify this, and the aforementioned arguments for each side, simply 
by comparing the range values of the factor in the two cases.
3.4 Partial Matching of Cases and Combinations of Factors
Ashley comments, that for each kind of legal claim domain law 
sources identify factors which are relevant when assessing the 
strength of each side’s position; some of which tend to favour one
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side, and some the other.29Typically a case will contain a number of 
such competing factors, none of which is individually determinative 
of the result, each being just one consideration of the judge when 
making his decision. Consequently, even if the NFS facts satisfy the 
elements of a factor with the same, or stronger values than those of 
any precedent which contains the factor, the outcome which that 
factor favours may still not follow, because it is just ‘an argument’ 
that the phrase it considers is (or is not) satisfied.
CBR addresses the question of what can be said about an open 
textured phrase when it occurs in a NFS containing a combination of 
competing factors. CBR is employed because in law it is not possible 
to articulate a rule which will always correctly determine what 
result will follow given a novel combination of factors (in a new NFS) 
even if it is clear what outcome each factor supports. It is not 
possible simply to sum the factors for each side, as some will be 
more important than others. Nor is it possible to allow for their 
relative importance simply by weighting them, as the importance of a 
factor depends on its context, i.e. its relationship with other factors 
in the case in which it occurs.30 Objective weighting of factors is not 
possible in law, and even if it was CBR would still be necessary as it 
justifies legal arguments, not just in terms of factors, which alone 
are insufficient when presenting a case, but by reference to 
precedents.
Reasoning with cases cannot determine the outcome in a new case, 
but it can suggest the best arguments each side can advance in 
support of the outcome that side is advocating. In CBR precedents are 
used as judicially sanctioned arguments, or warrants, that when a 
particular combination of factors occurs a certain result should 
follow. In other words, because lawyers are expected to justify their 
claims by reference to legislation, or cases, and because there is a 
legal tenet that like cases should be treated alike, if the NFS has 
factors in common with a precedent then a case based reasoner may 
cite that precedent as an argument that the result given in the 
precedent should be given in the NFS.31
Obviously the more similar a precedent is to the NFS (in terms of 
factors in common) the stronger the argument for its outcome.
53 Ashley, K. D. Reasoning with cases and hypothetical in HYPO. IJMMS-1, p. 757
30 ref. 21, p. 758
31 ref. 21, p. 758
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However the issue of which, of two precedents, is most similar, or 
most on point, is not simply a matter of summing the factors each 
case has in common with the NFS and comparing the totals. As 
already noted, some factors will be more important than others, and 
their relative importance can be different in different combinations. 
Additionally, when trying to assess the relative similarity to the NFS 
of two precedents, there is the unknown influence of any factor 
present in one precedent but not present in the NFS or the other 
precedent. Consequently a case based reasoner cannot be too 
ambitious in its attempts to identify the most on point precedents.
Therefore, in HYPO, one case is regarded as more on point than 
another (with respect to the NFS) only if the latter’s relevant 
factors, i.e. factors shared with the NFS, constitute a proper subset 
of the former’s.32 Additionally, if a particular precedent’s set of 
relevant factors is not subsumed by that of another precedent, then, 
with respect to those precedents whose factors it subsumes, it is the 
most on point (MOP) precedent. In HYPO no attempt is made to assign 
priority between two precedents, each of which has a factor in 
common with the NFS that the other lacks. Rather they are said to be 
equally on point. Consequently HYPO may identify more than one MOP 
case,33 but it will attempt to suggest which is the best case to use of 
several MOP cases favouring one side34.
This limited extent to which HYPO ranks the on pointless of 
precedents to the NFS is merely a reflection of Ashley’s recognition 
that it is not possible to objectively assess the relative importance 
of the factors they contain. Only if a case has all the factors in 
common with the NFS that another has, and some more besides, can it 
be argued that it is more on point than that other, and even then it 
may be distinguished because of the presence of additional factors 
not present in the NFS, or because of a difference in the value of a 
variable element of a factor.
The net result of all this is that, regarding the satisfaction of a 
particular open textured phrase, HYPO may return several MOP cases, 
and if these favour different sides then both sides have strong 
arguments, and no attempt is made to decide between them. 
According to MacCormick’s theory, the way such deadlock would be
55 ref. 21, see diagram p. 759
33 ref. 21, p. 780, also see diagram p. 781
34 ref. 21, p. 760
resolved is by appealing to principles; this is discussed in the next 
chapter.
It will be noted that I have only suggested one factor which might be 
relevant to the open textured phrase ‘unfit for only proper use’ , 
whereas the discussion in this section has been about what can be 
argued when there are several, competing, factors relevant to the 
satisfaction of a particular open textured phrase. However the 
important point is that, as an example of an open textured phrase, 
‘unfit for only proper use’ represents the sort of situation where a 
CBR facility, such as HYPO, should be available, i.e. A situation where, 
given a NFS, the law may be inconclusive as to whether the phrase is 
satisfied, but where the best case supported arguments available to 
each side can be established by identifying the factors present in the 
NFS, and comparing it with those precedents which contain some or 
all of the same factors.
3.5 Representation (and Utilisation) of Knowledge in HYPO
Ashley has designed his own frame-based case representation 
language (CRL) to represent the facts of a case at two levels of 
abstraction.
At the first level of abstraction, legal case frames (LCFs) are used to 
represent detailed factual objects, relationships, and events that are 
typically present in disputes of the subject domain. Any particular 
case, whether a precedent or a new problem, is described in terms of 
a number of nested LCFs.
At the second, more abstract level, factual predicates (FPs) are used 
to summarise the lower level case facts represented in LCFs. FPs are 
generalised factual statements that indicate whether certain legally 
significant relationships are true in the case. HYPO infers whether a 
FP is satisfied for a particular case by testing information about the 
case contained in the LCFs.
The other main knowledge structures in HYPO are dimensions. Each 
dimension represents a factor and contains a number of prerequisites. 
These prerequisites correspond to what I have termed the elements 
of a factor. In order for a dimension to apply to (i.e. for the 
corresponding factor to be regarded as present in) a particular case,
26
each of that dimension’s prerequisites must be satisfied by the 
case’s FPs.
In the simple scenario I have outlined in my domain the second level 
of abstraction, FPs, would not be necessary. The question of whether 
the factor (or dimension) I have suggested is satisfied by a particular 
case would simply require an examination of the basic facts of that 
case which would be described by LCFs. (However this is not to deny 
that there might be other factors identifiable in the domain whose 
elements are more general factual statements, and for which 
statements examination of the basic facts of the case would 
determ ine satisfaction.)
HYPO’S dimensions each have a focal slot prerequisite representing a 
factual category for which a range of values exists. This corresponds 
to the variable element I discussed in the context of factors. It 
allows for closer matching between the NFS and a precedent, for 
example, strengthening or weakening the force of the argument the 
precedent supports, in the manner I have discussed, if the range 
values of the element differ in the NFS and the precedent.
All precedents relevant to the claim (or phrase) at issue are 
described using the CRL, and are stored in a cases knowledge base 
(CKB). They are indexed by a library of dimensions. In order to present 
his problem to the system the user describes the NFS by filling in 
LCFs for it via a menu driven case editor. Thereafter the task of 
identifying the MOP precedents proceeds in the manner outlined when 
discussing factors.
This is a simplification of what HYPO does, but it is sufficient to 
indicate the potential utility of a HYPO type module for advising on 
open texture.
3.6 GFRs and Factors
In the previous chapter I outlined how a simple rule based expert 
system could be built, based on statute and case law, which would be 
capable of advising on a case like Daniels, in the deductive manner 
MacCormick describes. I then suggested that, in order for the simple 
rule based system to be able to advise on a wider range of problems, 
in which the facts may be similar to, but not the same as, those in
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the case derived rules, those rules should be supplemented with GFRs, 
ideally contained in a GFH. In this chapter I examined how CBR can be 
used to identify the strength of precedential argument for, and 
against, the satisfaction of a particular open textured term, which 
may occur either in a statutory, or case-derived rule. The 
examination was conducted in the context of one particular form of 
CBR, an alternative to which will be discussed later.
As the task of identifying factors, necessary for the HYPO form of 
CBR just discussed, and that of identifying GFRs might seem similar, 
it might be useful to emphasis the different purposes of CBR and 
reasoning with GFRs, in order to affirm the distinct nature of GFRs 
and factors, and to illustrate the potential of CBR and reasoning with 
GFRs to complement one another.
A GFR would be used to augment a clearly defined (case) rule. i.e. 
When a particular set of case facts can clearly be identified as 
constituting the necessary and sufficient conditions to satisfy a 
particular term (those facts constitute the conditions of a case rule), 
a GFR would express the expert’s assessment of one, or more, similar 
facts being allowed to satisfy one, or more, particular conditions of 
that case rule. CBR is used when one (or more), precedents satisfy a 
particular term or phrase, but it is not clear which groups of facts 
(i.e. factors) are necessary, or sufficient, for that satisfaction. In 
CBR what is at issue is whether a particular (novel) combination of 
factors can satisfy a particular term or phrase (which constitutes a 
condition in a rule, whether statute based or case based). With GFRs, 
the issue would be whether a particular fact can replace another 
particular fact (which constitutes a condition in a case rule).
A GFR would be generalised from the fact(s) of one case, with the 
generic terms it contains not being found in any case, whereas a 
factor is identified as being common to several cases, but each 
possibly having different values for one particular generic element, 
which is clearly discernible as common to all. Hence the idea of a GFR 
is to allow one to express the likelihood that a a particular case rule 
will be broadened in order to allow an argument that the case is 
analogous to a NFS. Whereas factors offer the potential for ranking 
several cases which already contain those factors according to how 
analogous they are to the NFS, without any expression of certainty.
Consequently, these two approaches to the inadequacies of a rule
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based model are not intended to be alternatives, but rather 
complements, and one might even suggest that they be integrated. For 
example, some of the elements in a case based reasoner’s factors 
might contain (or contain references to) progressively more generic 
terms, plus GFs. This would allow the authority of a precedent, which 
has a factor in common with the NFS, to be modified by the 
generality, or certainty, of that factor, relative to the NFS, as 
determined by the GFs of its component elements. For example, the 
first element of the factor I have suggested above, ‘bottled drink’ , 
might be generalised to ‘sealed item of sustenance’, or even simply 
‘item of sustenance’. Such a generalisation would allow the ‘tin of 
soup’ scenario I suggested earlier to be covered by the factor. 
However this generalisation would affect the certa inty of the 
factor’s acceptance as a valid indicator of sim ilarity between the 
NFS and the precedents the factor indexed, as one could not be sure 
that the court would accept the analogy between a tin of food, 
present in the NFS, and a bottled drink, present in those precedents, 
and this would in turn undermine the authority of the precedents. 
However, before attempting to assess the utility of integrating GFRs 
and CBR, the basic idea of GFRs would need to be implemented and 
tested so that it could be evaluated. Much work has already been done 
on CBR, and test results seem to demonstrate its ability to model 
legal argumentation, and return useful advice.
GFRs constitute an attempt to anticipate the exercise of one type of 
judicial discretion, i.e. Discretion as to whether a fact, similar to one 
present in a condition of a relevant case derived rule, should be 
allowed to satisfy that condition. This sort of discretion parallels 
that which is involved in MacCormick’s discussion of how judges 
resolve disputes when hard cases arise; this will hopefully become 
apparent in the ensuing chapters.
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Chapter 4
Hard Cases and Principles
4.1 Introduction
I will now examine how MacCormick suggests judges reason in hard 
cases, in which discretion is clearly available, and the extent to 
which his theory on this matter can be modelled.
First of all one should establish what prevents a case from being 
deductively resolved. What makes it a ‘hard case’, in which judges are 
free to exercise discretion, as opposed to a ‘clear case’, such as 
Daniels, in which the availability of discretion is all but non 
existent, and for whose resolution simple rule based expert systems 
are, as was demonstrated, adequate. MacCormick suggests ways in 
which a case may be ‘hard’, rather than ‘clear’, although he warns 
that the majority of cases do not fall neatly into either category.
A case may be hard because one of the relevant rules at issue is 
ambiguous or unclear, due to an open textured, or vague, phrase or 
concept.35 The question of how a choice between the competing 
versions of the rule which are available is made, is what MacCormick 
refers to as the ‘problem of interpretation’.36 Obviously CBR, or 
‘reasoning by analogy’, provides one approach to this problem, as has 
been explained, i.e. Find that case which has interpreted the phrase 
which is most similar to the NFS, and use that similarity to justify 
interpreting the phrase in the same way in the NFS. However, what if 
the cases are not very analogous to the NFS, or not persuasive or 
decisive either way? Such situations would seem to transcend the 
‘problem of interpretation’, and fall within the second type of hard
case MacCormick identifies, which is discussed next.
Sometimes a decision needs to be given regarding a matter for which 
there is no directly relevant rule of law. i.e. Justification of a 
decision by reference to a particular statutory provision, or case, is
not possible. (Alternatively, as just noted, the relevant rules may be
55 LRLT, p. 65-6
36 ref. 35, p. 68
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of little use.) Indeed the very matter at issue may be ‘whether there 
is or is not any legal ground at all for some claim or decision at 
la w ’ .37 What the judges then have to decide is ‘“ Does the law in any 
way justify a decision in favour of this party against that party in 
this context?’” .38 ‘The problem is, in effect, whether it is justifiable 
in law to assert, or to negate, some proposition ... which covers the 
facts of the instant case’.39 This MacCormick refers to as the 
‘problem of relevancy’,40 and it is in the context of one particular 
case, which epitomises this problem, that MacCormick presents his 
account of how judges exercise their discretion in hard cases. This 
case is Donoghue v. Stevenson [1932] A.C. 562; 1932 S.C. (H.L.) 31, 
which concerned the liability of the manufacturer of a product to 
those harmed as a result of a defect in that product which resulted 
from negligence in the production of the product.
Basically what judges (and counsel) do, according to MacCormick, 
when, in the way just noted they ‘run out of rules’, is appeal to legal 
principles. So, in order to be able to model, in an expert system, 
MacCormick’s theory of how judges resolve hard cases, the first task 
must be to identify general principles relevant to the domain in 
question.
4.2 Acquisition of Principles
The question of whether it is possible to identify the general 
principles which underlie the surface discourse of the law, and 
influence the resolution of hard cases, is something which has been 
disputed. Sometimes principles are clearly expounded in case law, 
obviously identifying these is not a problem. However, sometimes 
principles are relied on by judges which have not previously been 
expressly propounded. Can such principles be identified and 
incorporated into an expert system? Such a principle, the ‘neighbour 
principle’ , was articulated by Lord Atkin, who delivered the leading 
judgment of the majority in the case of Donoghue v. Stevenson. 
MacCormick claims that Lord Atkin’s reasoning when framing this 
principle exemplifies how all judges frame ‘new’ principles, so for 
the purpose of modelling MacCormick’s theory we should examine to 
what extent this process can be imitated.
37 ref. 35, p. 100
38 ref. 35, p. 69
39 ref. 35, p. 70
40 ref. 35, p. 70
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Susskind would appear to regard the exercise as pointless from the 
outset. He advises against trying to build expert systems to resolve 
hard cases, and his comments on the prospect of building a model of 
the legal concepts in a domain suggest he would argue against trying 
to identify and model principles, as concepts often appear in 
principles. Susskind observes that he has indicated the written 
materials which may be consulted to find the units with which a rule 
based model, capable of dealing with clear cases, may be built. He 
then comments that ‘There are no direct counterparts to those 
repositories in respect of the constituents of conceptual modelling.’41
I submit that text books and articles, by academics and practitioners, 
do articulate existing and inchoate principles, and policies, be they 
contentious or uncontroversial. Such sources must exist in order that 
the principles may be taught to students, and debated by academics 
and practitioners. This view, which of course directly challenges 
Susskind’s assertion, finds support in the work of J C Smith42. Smith 
advocates the need for a conceptual model in order to represent 
principles, and, furthermore, he notes that it is possible to extract 
defin itions of legal concepts (for example ‘esta te ’), from the 
secondary sources.43 These definitions might initially be in terms of 
other legal concepts, but can be progressively refined to simple 
terms for which decided cases give examples of satisfying facts. By 
examining the user’s facts it can be established whether the initial 
concept is satisfied or not. (It is worth noting that this ‘concept 
re fined  to s im ple fa c t(s ) ’ re la tionsh ip  seems to paralle l 
MacCormick’s theory of ‘ law as institutional fact’44, alluded to on p. 
191 of his book.) Smith and others at the Faculty of Law and 
A rtific ia l Inte lligence Research, at the University of British 
Columbia (UBC), have put his theory into practice in the Nervous 
Shock Advisor, the Hearsay Rule Advisor, and other projects, and 
obtained encouraging test results.
The task of identifying all the relevant principles in a domain would 
probably be beyond the ability of the legally trained knowledge 
engineer, so here a departure must be made from Susskind’s expert
41 ESL, p 155
42 Professor of Law at the University of British Columbia
43 Smith, J. C. A Conceptual Model for the Representation of Legal Knowledge, (paper)
p. 1
44 MacCormick, D. N. Law as Institutional Fact. Law Quarterly Review, 1974, Vol. 90, p. 102
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system development plan in which the expert does not become 
involved in a major way until tuning the model. The expert would have 
prime responsibility for identifying the principles (for most of the 
UBC projects the expert was Smith himself). It will no doubt be 
commented that this would compound the existing ‘acquisition of 
knowledge from the expert’ bottleneck, already a major problem in 
the development of expert systems in law (as Susskind notes in the 
preface to the paperback edition of his book) and this cannot be 
denied.
The attraction of suitably motivated academic experts is perhaps the 
best hope of alleviating this knowledge acquisition bottleneck, and in 
this context probably the best approach they could take to the task of 
identifying legal principles is to be found in the ‘deep structure 
approach’ to knowledge representation, developed by Smith and Cal 
Deedman, which has been used in the UBC projects.
Deep structure analysis involves searching for “deep structures or 
fact patterns underlying a legal doctrine which account for and 
explain the decisions in the cases. Once these patterns have been 
identified a broadly stated meta-rule or principle may be formulated 
which explains the general direction of the case law in the domain 
independently of the ‘surface discourse’ of law at the doctrinal 
le v e l” .45
Deedman makes the following comment about deep structure analysis. 
“ In order to make sense of a body of case law, some general unifying 
principle is needed. A solution which has been proposed in some 
detail elsewhere [i.e. in the proceedings of the First International 
Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law] , has been called the 
deep structure approach. In essence it calls for the formulation of a 
broadly stated underlying rule which explains the general direction 
that all the cases in a domain of law have taken independently of the 
surface discourse. Without such a rule to act as a compass, one finds 
oneself drifting aimlessly in a sea of a cases. There is no hard and 
fast way of discovering such a rule. It must be discerned by a careful 
examination of the facts of the cases themselves.”46
Kowalski, A. Case Based Reasoning and the Deep Structure Approach to Knowledge 
Representation. ICAIL-91, p.22
46 Deedman , C. Exposing some Myths about Law and Dispelling some Myths about 
Computers. (paper) p. 5
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The significance of these comments on deep structure analysis is 
that what Smith and Deedman are saying one should do, and do do 
themselves, when building an expert system, is exactly what 
MacCormick identifies Lord Atkin as doing when he formulated the 
‘neighbour princip le ’ on manufacturer’s liability, i.e. Lord Atkin 
looked at the relevant cases and argued that in them a general trend 
was perceptible, and that therefore from them a general principle 
could be inferred. So in effect what Smith and Deedman claim, and 
through their projects demonstrate, is that it is possible (for an 
expert) to extract principles from a domain, (whether they be 
regarded as not existing, or merely unarticulated, before hand), and 
their theory and achievements mirror this process which, according 
to MacCormick, all judges undertake when faced with hard cases.
Indeed the parallel between Smith’s theory, and that of MacCormick, 
can be seen in the following comment on deep structure analysis. 
“This theory postulates that judges and lawyers use deep structure 
fact patterns to decide cases and analyse problems ... whether ... at a 
subconscious level ... or in ... [a] more overt goal-oriented manner ... 
where solving a client's problem or arriving at a correct legal 
decision.47
The task of framing principles through identifying trends by deep 
structure analysis, might be formidable, even for a luminary in the 
domain field, but the UBC projects demonstrate that it is feasible. On 
the other hand, the task of identifying a particular trend, in order to 
articulate a principle, might be quite straightforward. MacCormick 
himself gives an example of identifying a trend, from case law, 
concerning the ‘neighbour principle’ ; that trend being from regarding 
it as a permissible to a mandatory principle.48 Another recent example 
of a clearly discernible trend in an area of law, which all lawyers 
should have been aware of, would be the trend towards making 
marital rape a crime in England.
Obviously the principles identified through deep structure analysis 
would not be uncontentious, even if the work of more than one expert, 
but that is not a valid objection to the exercise as the opinions of 
counsel are not indisputable (if they were then there would be no 
point in going to court), and the most that an expert system can do,
47 Kowalski, A. Case Based Reasoning and the Deep Structure Approach to Knowledge 
Representation. ICAIL-91, p.22
48 LRLT, p. 159
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after all, is offer an opinion.
4.3 Deep Structure Analysis and HYPO
It is perhaps instructive at this point to make some comparisons 
between one of the UBC projects, the Nervous Shock Advisor,49 and the 
HYPO project discussed in the previous chapter, to suggest why 
Ashley did not propose a deep structure analysis for his system, as 
both deal with case based law.
Deep structure analysis involves an attempt to identify the main 
facts which must be established to succeed in a claim of nervous 
shock, and this seems to parallel the process of identifying factors in 
the domain of trade secret law, which denote the main elements 
relevant to success in particular trade secret claims, e.g. trade 
secret misappropriation.
The reason why Ashley does not propose a deep structure analysis, 
whereas Smith and Deedman do, is because nervous shock is a vaguely 
defined area of case law (deliberately chosen by Smith and Deedman 
for that reason), in which the relevant facts are not already clearly 
identified in the secondary sources, whereas in the domain of trade 
secret law they are. The nervous shock domain, being a vaguely 
defined area of tort (or delict) case law, parallels the Donoghue v. 
Stevenson area of m anufacturers’ liab ility  more closely than 
Ashley’s technical domain of trade secrets. Hence my earlier 
proposal, when discussing CBR, for the domain expert to extract 
factors from the primary and secondary sources, might require what 
Smith and Deedman would describe as a deep structure analysis.
4.4 Framing Principles at various Levels of Generality
It might be noted that a court only considers what general principle 
it can formulate in the context of a specific case (i.e. the NFS). 
Therefore the level of generality of that general principle is probably 
not going to be much higher than what is necessary to cover the NFS, 
because it should be consistent with existing rules and principles, 
and the more general it is the greater the chance of inconsistency.
33 Deedman, C. & Smith, J. C. The Nervous Shock Advisor: A Legal Expert System in 
Case-based Law. (paper)
(MacCormick observes that the requirement of consistency takes 
priority over other considerations, such as the result of employing 
consequentialist argument, on which see later, because no matter 
how desirable a particular ruling may be on consequentialist grounds, 
it must not contradict existing valid rules.50)
However an expert system would require the formulation of a general 
principle in a vacuum; i.e. out of the context of a specific NFS. Thus, 
from the relevant precedents, a general princip le would be 
formulatable at various levels of generality. MacCormick himself 
observes that out of the context of a specific case, a principle 
capable of covering an area of law can be framed at various levels of 
gene ra lity ,51 and he illustrates this by borrowing an example of the 
d iffe ren t levels of genera lity at which a princip le covering 
manufacturers’ liability to consumers could have been phrased at the 
time of Donoghue v. Stevenson.52
Therefore, as the expert system is constructed in advance of a NFS 
arising, it is arguable that the expert should be free to generalise the 
facts of the relevant cases to provide more than one version of a 
potential general principle so the system (or user) could select the 
one closest to his NFS.
4.5 The need for a Certainty Factor (and MacCormick’s 
contribution to its assessment)
Having projected a general principle at one or more levels of 
generality, the expert should then attach a certainty factor to each 
version of the principle, to indicate to the user his (the expert’s) 
certainty that the court would accept that version if advanced. This 
certa inty factor would reflect two things. Firstly, the expert’s 
certainty that the court would want to accept the principle, which 
was previously unarticulated, secondly, that the court would want to 
accept the version of the principle at the particular level of 
generality concerned. MacCormick’s theory provides guidance on the 
assessment of the first of these matters. Basically it would require 
the expert to speculate as to the court’s view of the desirability of 
the consequences which would ensue if that principle existed, using
so LRLT, p106
51 ref. 50, p. 118
52 ref. 50, p. 117-8
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certain criteria which MacCormick claims judges evaluate when 
making this desirability assessment. (A fuller explanation of this 
w ill be given shortly when discussing consequentialist argument.) 
Additionally, it would be necessary for the expert to reflect in this 
first assessment his certainty that he had correctly identified the 
underlying trends and developments in the domain when framing his 
proposed principle.
The second of these matters paralle ls the expert’s task of 
determining the GFs to be associated with generic terms, in regard to 
their relationship with particular relevant facts in a particular case 
rule, when formulating a GFR. (See section 2.3 in chapter 2.) The 
difference here would be that the expert would probably have 
generalised from various different case facts, in many precedents (or 
case rules). As with GFRs, the resultant certainty values, or GFs, for 
the different conditions in the principle, would have to be combined 
to produce a composite certainty value for the principle’s likely 
acceptance, on the grounds of generality, at the particular level of 
generality at which it was pitched. This in turn would have to be 
combined with the certainty value produced for the first matter, in 
order to produce an overall certainty factor for the principle at this 
particular level of generality. This process would be repeated for 
each version of the principle.
4.6 Consequentialist Argument
Although it might be possible for an expert to identify principles in a 
domain of law, there are other problems which judges (and counsel) 
face when attempting to apply principles. The first problem that 
MacCormick notes is that more than one principle may seem relevant, 
and they may conflict. Alternatively there may be dispute as to 
whether or not what is claimed to be a relevant principle covering 
the instant case is in fact a valid principle of law (this was in fact 
the situation in Donoghue v. Stevenson ). Thus if a judge (or expert) 
claims to have identified a previously unarticulated principle in the 
domain law, others may challenge its valid ity. In both these 
situations, says MacCormick, judges justify their decisions, whether 
it concerns which of two conflicting principles to support, or 
whether to support or deny a proposed principle, by applying 
consequentialist argument.
The following discussion of consequentialist argument looks firstly
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at its use in the context of the latter type of situation, as this is the 
main context in which MacCormick discusses it; following that 
examples of its application in the former type of situation will be 
given.
Basically a judge decides, when there is dispute over the validity of a 
principle, whether the consequences which would ensue if the 
principle were adopted, are desirable (or acceptable) or not. He is 
faced with a specific context in which to make that assessment (i.e. 
the instant case before him), however he must bear in mind that the 
principle will apply to future analogous scenarios, and therefore he 
must speculate on such scenarios, and make his evaluation in the 
light of them as well.
MacCormick notes four potentially competing criteria to be evaluated 
when making this decision,53 although he says there may be others 
(i.e. these constitute a minimum) which are as follows. The concept 
of ‘corrective justice’ , i.e. (paraphrasing MacCormick) that someone 
who suffers wrong because of the fault of another should be 
compensated by that other.54 The question of what is in the ‘public 
interest’ , e.g., in the context of Donoghue v. Stevenson, should the 
manufacturer of a product which may cause harm always be liable if 
it does, or would the price increase which would result if he had to 
insure himself against any possible action be contrary to the public 
interest in cheapness of goods? The criterion of ‘legal expediency’, or 
‘convenience’ , which is sometimes advanced to show that a claim 
which might be meritorious on the ground of ’corrective justice’ 
should not be allowed as it would result in the courts being 
overwhelmed by a flood of similar claims. ‘Common sense’, i.e. what 
would people in general think was the right result. This last criterion 
reflects the view that, according to MacCormick, judges try to assess 
and reflect contemporary positive morality (e.g. the current social 
climate) when making their decision, and as such it lends support to 
my view that there is validity in someone other than a judge 
attempting to anticipate a judge’s evaluation of the principle’s 
acceptability. A recent example of law making in England (referred to 
earlier), seems to emphasise the importance of the contemporary 
positive morality ground of evaluation (i.e. the importance of 
reflecting the public view). The Lords decided that the importance of 
reflecting current social attitudes should take priority over the
53 ref. 50, pp. 110-111, 114
54 ref. 50, p. 111
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established law on marital rape, even though there was no 
controversy over what the law said. (The English cases were 
consistent and contrary to the decision the Lords made, though they 
(the Lords) did find support in the Scottish cases.)
Examples of the sort of analogous scenarios which an expert would 
have to consider, when deciding on consequentialist grounds whether 
to support or deny the existence of a principle, can be found in 
Donoghue v. Stevenson. The facts of the case were as follows. Mrs. 
Donoghue, the pursuer, drank some of the contents of an opaque bottle 
of Stevevson’s ginger beer bought by a friend. She then discovered in 
the remainder of the contents the remnants of a decomposing snail, 
and this caused her to suffer gastroenteritis and nervous shock. She 
averred the presence of the snail in the ginger beer was due to the 
failure of the manufacturer to take reasonable care in the preparation 
and bottling of the ginger beer. The principle at issue was whether 
the manufacturer of a product owed a duty, independent of contract, 
to the ultimate consumer of the product, to take reasonable care in 
its manufacture.
As well as considering whether (on the basis of at least the four 
criteria noted), the consequences of the principle existing given the 
instant facts were desirable, it was also necessary to contemplate 
other, possible future scenarios, which it would cover. For example, 
Lord Tomlin suggested that everyone injured in a train accident which 
was caused by a defective axle, which was the result of the 
m anufacturer’s negligence, would have an action against him. 
Although, on the one hand, it would seem just that the manufacturer 
should be accountable to all those harmed due to his negligence, other 
consequences, it was suggested, were undesirable. For example, the 
manufacturer might go bankrupt, because of the possibility of having 
to meet so many unforeseeable (because non contractual) claims, 
alternatively the cost of insuring against many claims might make 
the business itself not worth conducting. Additionally there is the 
above noted inconvenience argument of the court being overburdened 
by a flood of similar claims.
This scenario was quite different from the actual situation existing 
in the case, and other scenarios suggested, such as arsenic in bread. 
Consequently it illustrates that the expert would need to consider 
scenarios apparently unrelated to each other, which the proposed 
principle would cover, when considering the desirability of that
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principle, but this is something any lawyer should be able to do (and 
the expert would of course be a lawyer).
4.7 Conflicting Principles and Consequentialist Argument
An example of the application of consequentialist argument when two 
principles conflict can be seen in Read v. J. Lyons & Co. Ltd. 1947 A.C. 
156. Two principles, of the law of tort (i.e. delict), were potentially 
applicable, i.e. ‘a man acts at his peril’, and ‘a man is not liable 
unless he is to blame’. The appellant claimed the respondent was 
liable in damages for injury without proof of fault (i.e. negligence). In 
other words she alleged strict liab ility, founding her claim on 
Rylands v. Fletcher (1868) L.R. 3 H.L. 330, which applied the first of 
the above principles. The Lords denied this. e.g. Lord Porter said that 
the (strict) liability (of Rylands ) alleged ‘is an extension of the 
general rule, and, in my view, it is undesirable to extend it further.’ 
MacCormick says of this comment that ‘The passage ... explicitly 
acknowledges that in such a case, where there are competing 
principles which could provide the necessary legal support for a 
decision either way, the final choice between them must be based 
upon an evaluation of which general principle it is desirable to follow 
in the type of case in question.’
Lord MacMillan, also in Read, said that the principle of no fault 
liab ility  (i.e. s trict liab ility) for personal injury should not be 
extended to this case. He referred to Holdsworth’s ‘History of English 
Law’ as tracing the evolution of the relevant law ‘from the principle 
that every man acts at his peril and is liable for all the consequences 
of his acts, to the principle that a man’s freedom of action is subject 
only to the obligation not to infringe on any duty of care which he 
owes to others.’ From which he infered that ‘as the law now stands an 
allegation of negligence is in general essential to the relevancy of an 
action of reparation for personal in juries.’ This passage further 
supports the earlier stated view that legal trends, and therefore 
principles themselves, can be identified from the secondary sources, 
and that in doing so one can indeed expect to anticipate the practice 
of the courts.
Another example is provided by the Scottish case of White & Carter 
(Councils) Ltd. v. McGregor [1962] A.C. 413; 1962 S.C. (H.L.) 1. A 
contract was made between two parties whereby the appellants were
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to advertise for the respondent. The respondent repudiated the 
contract by letter on the same day. The appellants went ahead with 
the advertising and sued for the full price due under the contract. The 
respondent claimed that the appellants were only entitled to damages 
for breach of contract based on loss of profit, not the full price. The 
court held for the appellants on the principle that a contract cannot 
be revoked by the unilateral repudiation of one party. As against that 
there was the equally well established general rule, or ‘principle’ , 
that a party who has sustained damage as a result of another’s breach 
of contract must take reasonable steps to minimise his own loss, and 
thus minimise the compensation recoverable. There were two equally 
applicable principles available, the justification of a choice between 
them being, according to MacCormick, a matter of evaluative 
argument. To show how close the decision was in this case 
MacCormick notes some of the arguments of counsel for the 
respondent which were adopted by the dissentient Lords Morton and 
Keith, and gave some embarrassment to the majority. It is worth 
reciting one of the arguments here as it illustrates the sort of 
hypothetical situation which an expert would have to consider when 
contemplating the desirab ility  of the adoption of a particular 
principle, and because it illustrates that this desirability evaluation 
is, as MacCormick states, irreducibly subjective, because although 
the scenarios seemed very convincing arguments for the respondent, 
they were in fact rejected by the majority.
For example, it was argued that it would be contrary to public policy 
if an expert was employed by a company to go abroad and prepare a 
report, and the company repudiated the contract before anything had 
been done, if then he was still entitled to go ahead and prepare the 
report, because in such a case he could extort in settlement far more 
than reasonable compensation, (i.e. He could threaten to go ahead and 
prepare the unwanted report unless the company ‘paid him off.)
4.8 Consequentialist Argument and Artificial Intelligence
The need to understand, for the purpose of expert systems 
development, how judges reach their decisions in areas of uncertain 
law is acknowledged by two long term researchers in Al and law, 
Donald Berman and Carole Hafner. They observe that “lawyers do not 
make decisions based on what the rules ‘say’. Rather, they base their 
decisions on how decision makers will apply those rules to specific
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factua l s itua tion .”55 What MacCormick offers, in his theory of 
consequentialist argument, is an explanation of how decision makers 
apply the rules, in the sense of how they decide which ‘rules’ to 
apply.
Unfortunately current Al and law techniques cannot assist in the task 
of anticipating a judge’s assessment of the desirability of the 
consequences of a particular principle. The best that can be done is, 
as indicated in the section before last (section 4.6), for the expert to 
make the assessment, and to use a certainty factor to reflect his 
confidence in both this desirability (or likeliness of adoption on 
consequentialist grounds) assessment, and his appreciation of the 
general legal, or judicial, trend regarding law making in the domain. 
(For example, based on the desirability of the two principles at issue 
in Read, and the legal trend identifiable in Holdsworth, the expert 
would (hopefully) attach a higher certainty factor to the ‘no liability 
w ithout fau lt’ principle than to the ‘s trict liab ility ’ principle.) 
Ideally the expert should, in addition, take into account such things 
as the social and political background of the judges who will hear the 
cases, and reflect this also in the certainty factor. However as he 
would not know who will hear a particular case, this ‘personal 
biases’ factor would have to be left to the user to assess. As already 
discussed, the above noted certainty factor would constitute part of 
an overall certainty value attached to each version of a particular 
principle, the other component reflecting the expert’s certainty that 
the level of generality of the version would be acceptable. (Of course 
this other component would not be necessary for well established 
principles, such as those at issue in Read, but it would for ‘new’ 
principles the expert had framed.)
Current Al and law techniques might, however, be of assistance in 
another task which is an integral part of MacCormick’s theory, i.e. 
Establishing how the domain cases which are arguably covered by a 
proposed principle can be reconciled with it. This possibility is 
discussed next.
55 Berman, D. H. & Hafner, C. D. The Potential of Artificial Intelligence to Help Solve the 
Crisis in Our Legal System. Commun. ACM. Aug. 1989, Vol.32, No.8, p. 3
42
Chapter 5
Principles and Relevant Cases
5.1 Introduction
So far I have stated that in order to build an expert system which 
accords with MacCormick’s theory of hard case resolution it will be 
necessary for an expert to identify or formulate the principles which 
a court may hold applicable, and for him to forecast the probability of 
them being adopted, on the basis of an evaluation of the desirability 
of their consequences, knowledge of trends in the domain law, and the 
levels of generality at which they are formed. I have found support 
for the assertion that the expert can formulate potential principles, 
by identifying trends, in the work of J C Smith and his colleagues at 
UBC.
I have stated that the expert’s probability assessments would take 
the form of certainty factors attached to the principles, and on this 
matter it might be noted that the Nervous Shock Advisor attaches 
percentage certainty factors to its opinions,66 but it is not clear what 
particular criteria are evaluated in determining these. MacCormick’s 
theory provides guidance on this determination. I now wish to 
examine the extent to which computational techniques can be used to 
establish that the principles that the expert proposes are consistent 
with the domain cases, in a manner which mirrors the way 
MacCormick says judges perform this task.
5.2 Reconciling Principles with Case Law
According to MacCormick’s theory of how judges formulate a ‘new’ 
principle, one of the major tasks they undertake is that of reconciling 
the principle with (or, one might say, justifying the principle in 
terms of), the relevant case law. It is not enough simply for the 
principle to be desirable on consequentialist grounds, it is also 
necessary to find support for it in the underlying case law, and any 
relevant cases which are unfavourable to it must be explained or
w ref. 55, p~2
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distinguished. Therefore I will suggest how an expert, assisted by Al 
techniques, might reconcile and refine a ‘ rough’ principle on 
manufacturer’s liability (possibly framed as a result of identifying 
trends through deep structure analysis, or simply speculated through 
his, i.e. the expert’s, familiarity with the domain law), in a way that 
mirrors the reconciliation performed by Lord Atkin who formulated 
the ‘neighbour principle’ in Donoghue v. Stevenson. I use this example 
because the formulation of this principle, according to MacCormick, 
exem plifies  the way judges form ula te  new, or a rticu la te  
unexpressed, principles, in a hard case in any domain.
This reconciliation task would obviously precede the actual building 
of the expert system in which the principle was to be employed. 
Therefore for later convenience, and to emphasise the distinction 
between the use of Al techniques when building the system, and when 
using it, one might refer to the program, or programs collectively, 
which would implement the techniques discussed in the following 
pages, as constituting a ‘principle-cases reconciliation system ’ ; 
although some of the programs might also be used in the expert 
system itself.
5.2.1 Identifying Relevant Cases
As a starting point, as suggested, the expert would have framed a 
rough principle, based on his knowledge of the cases. For example, 
from his knowledge of the cases on manufacturers’ liability, he might 
surmise the follow ing. That as each case considered whether 
manufacturers of a particular type of defective product were liable 
to the ultimate user if harmed by it, it might be possible to 
generalise and try to establish a general proposition of law that “any 
manufacturer of a defective product j_£ liable to the ultimate user if 
harmed by it” . He would know that the likelihood of the court 
accepting this general principle would increase the more the 
individual cases found for the product user (i.e. the plaintiff), and if 
he could distinguish and explain those that did not.
It would be necessary for the facts of the domain cases to be 
represented in a formalism suitable for CBR to be performed on them. 
More detail on that will be given in due course. However, it would 
also be necessary for each case represented to contain an account of 
the main legal points at issue in that case, e.g. “ manufacturers’
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liability to consumer” . This information could be manually extracted 
from the headnotes contained in the case reports of each decided 
case. Alternatively, rather than using the actual headnotes contained 
in case reports, significant legal phrases, such as the above, might be 
automatically identified from the full case texts using the text 
analysis mechanism employed by Gelbart and Smith in their FLEXICON 
system.57 This mechanism recognises complex legal phrases, based on 
approximate matches of words and word ordering,58 and incorporates 
them into structured case profiles.59 (More on what FLEXICON does 
will be noted shortly.)
Using the accounts, or summaries, of legal points at issue a program 
could identify potentially relevant cases, either through simple 
keyword search, if the summaries had been manually constructed, or 
by employing Gelbart and Smith’s more sophisticated legal phrase, or 
concept, searching, if FLEXICON profiles, (plus a concept index) had 
been generated. Gelbart and Smith themselves specifically note one 
of the purposes of FLEXICON as being to allow a user to search for 
cases that share common legal issues.60 Some of the cases on 
manufacturers’ liability which would have been identifiable in this 
way at the time of Donoghue v. Stevenson will be discussed shortly.
5.2.2 D istinguishing Factually D issim ilar, Unfavourable  
Cases
The next task would be to identify which of the potentially relevant 
cases held for the user, and thus could be advanced as supporting the 
principle. This should be a fairly straightforward text analysis task, 
as it would be noted in whose favour the case was decided in the case 
headnote.
It would then be necessary to explain and distinguish the 
unfavourable relevant cases (i.e. those which did not hold for the 
user). The first way in which this might be attempted would require 
the facts of each case to have been represented in a CBR formalism, 
such as GREBE’s (discussed in section 2.4 and illustrated shortly),
57 Gelbart, D. & Smith, J. C. Beyond Boolean Search: FLEXICON, A Legal Text-Based 
Intelligent System ICAIL-91, pp. 225-234
58 ref. 57, p. 226
59 ref. 57, p. 225
60 ref. 57, p. 226
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which would allow a case based reasoner to identify which
unfavourable cases were factually similar, and which dissimilar, to 
the favourable cases. Those which were dissimilar could obviously be 
argued as (factually) distinguishable from the favourable ones, and 
their identification would prompt the expert to refine his principle 
so that it did not embrace them. For example, moving away,
temporarily, from the consideration of a principle covering the 
liab ility of a manufacturer of a defective product, suppose the 
principle of ‘s tric t liab ility of a manufacturer of a dangerous 
substance to those harmed by it’ was being considered after the 
cases of Rylands and Read had occurred. The case of Rylands would 
support the principle, but the case of Read, which considered 
Rylands, but in which the principle of ‘no liability without fault’ was 
given priority, would undermine it. However, the reason why a 
different decision could be given in Read was because of a factual 
difference, i.e. the harm suffered occurred on the manufacturer’s 
premises in Read, but outwith it in Rylands. So, assuming a case 
based reasoner would detect such a difference (and this would of 
course depend on the level of factual detail at which the cases were
represented, a matter which is considered later, see chapter 7), the
expert would add the rider “where the harm occurs outwith the 
manufacturer’s premises” to the ‘strict liab ility ’ principle, so that 
Read fell outwith its scope.
At this point some comments should be made about the actual process 
of casting cases into a CBR formalism, and the promise that the 
FLEXICON project holds. FLEXICON incorporates an attempt to 
address one of the fundamental bottlenecks concerning the computer 
manipulation of cases, i.e., the fact that the representation of case 
information in the required formalism is a time consuming, manual 
task. Gelbart and Smith note that case reports can now easily be 
provided in electronic form, either directly from the courts, or by 
scanning hard copy documents, and they state that their system can 
autom atically build up a profile of a case in terms of the
relationships between four parameters: the legal concepts involved, 
cases and legislation cited, and the critical facts.61
The ability of FLEXICON to identify the critical factual elements of a 
case suggests that it could be used to automatically obtain the
components required for a GREBE like representation of a case. (As
noted in section 2.4, for the purpose of CBR in GREBE a structured
81 ref. 57, p. 225
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representation of cases is used,62 i.e., each case is represented in 
terms of its objects, e.g. ‘tangible entities’ , and ‘ legal relations’ ; and 
the relationships among them. Examples are given shortly.) However, 
comparison with manual analyses of cases would need to be 
conducted to determine how successful FLEXICON was in identifying 
all the relevant facts, and it is not clear whether FLEXICON actually 
identifies the relationships among facts themselves.
It should be noted that the authors themselves recognise the 
potential of FLEXICON’s automatic text analysis capability to provide 
a front end to a case based reasoner. ‘ ... we wish to explore to what 
extent case-based reasoning can also be automated and incorporated 
into the existing system to produce case retrieval as well as expert 
predictive capability without the tremendous manual effort required 
to construct traditional advisory systems.’63
5.2.3 Reconciling Factually Indistinguishable, Unfavourable 
Cases
Returning to the issue of reconciling the principle with the case law, 
some method other than distinguishing on factual grounds would be 
necessary to reconcile cases identified as factually similar to those 
supporting the principle, but unfavourable in their outcome.
5.2.3.1 Wrongly Decided
One way in which a case which is factually similar to one supporting 
the principle, but unfavourable, might be explained, is by claiming it 
was wrongly decided. To do this it must be shown to be (arguably) 
inconsistent with the previous case law. For example, the following 
two cases would be identified as similar, one favourable, the other 
unfavourable. (Two more cases will be introduced a bit later. These 
four cases are just a sample of the many cases that were relevant to 
the issue of manufacturers’ liability at the time of Donoghue v. 
Stevenson, and were considered in that case.) I will outline the facts 
of these cases to show how I believe they might partly have been 
expressed, and identified as similar, using a GREBE like formalism.
62 Branting, L. K. Building Explanations from Rules and Structured Cases. IJMMS-1, p. 808
63 ref. 57, p. 232
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Mullen v. Barr & Co. 1929 S.C. 461. The facts were as follows. A 
bottle of ginger beer was bought by Mrs. Mullen from a retailer. 
Unknown to her it contained a dead mouse. She gave some of it to her 
children to drink. They were poisoned by drinking the contents. Held, 
by majority, no duty was owed by the manufacturers to a consumer 
who had not contracted with them, and that in any event negligence 
had not been proved.
This was the most recent case on manufacturers’ liability at the time 
of Donoghue v. Stevenson.
George v. Skivington (1869) L.R. 5 Exch. 1. The facts were as follows. 
A husband bought shampoo from a chemist (the manufacturer) for his 
w ife . His w ife  used it and was in ju red . Held, the 
manufacturer/chemist was liable for unskilfullness and negligence in 
manufacture to those for whom the product was purchased.
If the cases had been represented in a GREBE like format, all objects 
in the cases, and relationships among them, would be expressly 
represented.
In order to produce these representations the system would contain a 
(GREBE like) hierarchy or taxonomy of domain objects. The 
taxonomy/hierarchy would be implemented as a semantic network; 
the objects would be represented as frames in the network, and 
relationships among them would be represented as slots in the 
fram es.64 Such a structure would include within it the simple GFH 
(discussed earlier, in section 2.4), and it might be termed the domain 
hierarchy.
64 ref.62, pp. 808-9
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Legal Action
Grant of Right to Use Goods (A,B)
Transfer of Right Creation of Right
Contract of Sale Gift Hire Authorised Use
/
Legal BodyPhysical Entity
Person Company
A and B are Legal Bodies
Figure 3. Example of possible parts of the domain hierarchy.
The ‘Grant of Right to Use Goods (A,B)’ object would subsume 
particular Legal Actions, in which Legal Body A bestows the right to 
use an item, or items, (not represented in the diagram), on Legal Body 
B. A and B would be slots in a frame representing a particular Grant 
of Right, thereby expressing the relationship between that Grant, and 
the Legal Bodies which are parties to it.
Mullen (unfavourable), and George (favourable), would be represented 
in terms of these objects as follows. (Each ‘T’ is an instance of the 
particular Legal Action ‘Transfer of Right’.)
e.g.1 Mullen v. Barr & Co
T1(A,B) T2(B,C) T3(C,D)
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A = manufacturer/defender i.e. Barr 
B = retailer
C = purchaser/pursuer’s wife i.e. Mrs. Mullen 
D = injured parties i.e. the children
T1 = Sale i.e. T1 is a specific type of Transfer (and Grant) of Right; 
a Sale.
T2 = Sale
T3 = Gift i.e. T3 is a specific type of Transfer (and Grant) of Right; 
a Gift.
e.g.2 George v. Skivington 
T1(A,B) T2(B,C)
A = manufacturer/defender i.e. Skivington 
B = purchaser/co-pursuer i.e. husband 
C = injured party/co-pursuer i.e. wife 
T1 = Sale 
T2 = Gift
When attempting to match cases, GREBE attempts to find the closest 
match, both factually (i.e. in terms of what objects are involved), and 
structurally (i.e. in terms of how the objects are related to each 
other). This allows GREBE to attempt to improve a match, once it has 
established a basic degree of similarity by identifying shared facts, 
by investigating different variations of the structure of the NFS, and 
thus identifying the best structural mapping.65 Presumably this is 
intended to simulate the practice of a lawyer whereby, when faced 
with a particular unfavourable precedent, he attempts to identify an 
alternative, plausible reading, or construction, of the established 
facts or events of the NFS, so that he can argue that what happened in 
the NFS was not the same as what happened in the precedent, even 
though the facts involved in the two cases were the same. (This is 
what some researchers might refer to as a ‘legal heuristic’.) If it is 
possible to improve the match between cases in this way, it is 
presumably also possible to do the opposite and attempt to worsen 
the match between factually sim ilar cases, by trying to identify 
incompatible structures. This would be something to attempt at the 
end of the stage just discussed, (i.e. that of trying to distinguish 
relevant unfavourable cases by comparing their facts), once an
6S ref. 62, p. 817
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attem pt to distinguish them simply on the basis of factual 
dissim ilarity had failed. However, this technique would be of little 
use for the cases we are considering, due to the simplicity of the 
structures they involve.
Structurally both these cases constitute a simple chain of Transfers, 
transferring the right to use a product from a manufacturer to an 
ultimate consumer. Factually both contain a non-contractual transfer 
in their chain of Transfers. (The matching algorithm might check for 
the presence of such a transfer in a chain, as the presence of a non­
contractual transfer in one case and not in another could constitute a 
significant difference between the two. For example, it might be that 
certain contractual rights can be transferred through a series of 
contracts.) The only actual difference between the two cases would 
be minor, i.e. an extra Transfer, and an extra Person, involved in 
Mullen.
CBR would thus identify these cases as very closely matched, 
factually and structurally, and therefore equally relevant to the 
desired principle. So how could the principle-cases reconciliation 
system explain away Mullen, while keeping George? Especially as, on 
the basis of other considerations, Mullen might be regarded as the 
most compelling authority. For example, it was decided more recently 
than George, and, as regards a NFS arising in Scotland (which was the 
country in which the facts of Donoghue v. Stevenson took place), it 
was decided in the same jurisdiction, and at a high level of court.
To do this it would be necessary to establish that the majority of 
cases prior to Mullen were reconcilable with, or favourable to, the 
principle. Achieving this would support the argument that the court in 
Mullen had failed to comprehensively consider all the relevant case 
law, or that it had drawn the wrong conclusions from its 
consideration, and that consequently the case was wrongly decided.
Thus, when conducting its examination of the relevant domain case 
law, the principle-cases reconciliation system would note if a recent 
unfavourable case, which, on the grounds of age, jurisdiction, and 
level of court, could be argued as the most compelling authority for a 
possible NFS, was in conflict with the majority of previous factually 
sim ilar precedents.
For example, another case which would be identified at the outset as
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considering the legal issues relevant to the proposed principle on 
m anufacturers’ liability, and then as being supportive of that 
principle, and also as being factually similar to George v. Skivington, 
and Mullen, would be Hawkins v. Smith (1896) 12 T.L.R. 532. Here the 
defendant, the manufacturer of a defective sack, was held liable for 
injury sustained by a dock worker using the sack, he (the defendant) 
knowing the use to which the sack was intended to be put, on the 
ground of negligence. A very close factual and structural match could 
be identified between this and the other two cases in spite of some 
differences; these being that rights were Created, rather than 
Transferred, in Hawkins.
These differences would not have been significant for the principle 
proposed because the important thing, in this, as in the other cases, 
was that the injured party was a legitimate user of the defective 
product. This the system would establish as a result of inferring, 
from the specific types of Grant of Right to Use present in the 
precedent, a sequence of Grants from the manufacturer to the injured 
party.
However, in order to be able to make such inferences, (and as a 
consequence to be able to treat a case involving a Hire as as on point 
as one involving a Sale), the system would need to know that, for the 
principle being considered, none of the specific terms subsumed by 
the generic term Grant was to be regarded as remote from it, i.e. they 
and Grant were to be treated as synonyms. This in turn would require 
that when the expert described his proposed ‘rough’ principle to the 
principle-cases reconciliation system he did so in some degree of 
detail, so that the system could establish exactly what groups of 
terms in the hierarchy it could regard as interchangeable when 
attempting to identify relevant cases. Thus when the expert 
described the principle under consideration (noted at the start of this 
section) to the system, it would question whether the ‘user’ 
concerned was a legitimate user, i.e. one who had a right to use the 
product. On establishing this to be the case, the system would know 
that it was necessary to establish an unbroken chain of Grants of the 
right to use the product, starting with the manufacturer and ending 
with the injured user, for a precedent to be factually relevant to (i.e. 
subsumable under) the principle. Furthermore it would know that such 
a precedent would be relevant no matter how many individual Grants 
there were in the chain (hence the unimportance of the extra Grant 
and Legal Body in Mullen compared with George), or the type of
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Grants involved.
The system would also question the expert about the type of ‘user’ 
involved in the principle, establish it to be a Legal Body, and thus 
know that the Grants in the precedents could involve either a Person 
or a Company. Thus cases differing only as regards type of Grants or 
Legal Bodies involved, or number of Grants involved in a chain, would 
be treated as equally on point with regard to the principle. Hawkins 
would therefore be matched to George and Mullen.
e.g. 3 Hawkins v. Smith
C1(A,B) C2(B,C) C3(C,D)
A = manufacturer/defendant i.e. Smith 
B = consignees 
C = dock company
D = dock worker/injured party/pursuer i.e. Hawkins
C1 = Hire i.e. C1 is a specific type of Creation (and Grant) of Right;
a Hire.
C2 = Authorised Use i.e. C2 is a specific type of Creation (and Grant) 
of Right; an Authorised Use.
C3 = Authorised Use
Given the bases of the judgments in the two similar, favourable 
cases, George v. Skivington and Hawkins v. Smith, the expert would 
note that in both it was necessary for the plaintiff to establish 
negligence to succeed, and also that in Mullen negligence was not 
proved, so he could refine his general principle to produce a version 
which asserted that the manufacturer would be liable if negligent in 
his production. This would have a higher certainty factor than the 
original version. However the argument this refinement would sustain 
would be in addition to, not instead of, the argument that Mullen was 
simply wrongly decided given the contrary weight of the previous 
case law.
It is important to note that what the reconciliation system would be 
doing here would be attempting to construct an argument which, 
depending on the NFS presented to the expert system, it might not be 
possible to use. For example, as regards an attempt to explain away 
Mullen, if the court in which the product user was bringing the action 
was in the same jurisdiction, and at a lower or equal position in the
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court hierarchy, than Mullen, then the proposed principle would not be 
allowed, because the court would (normally) regard itself as being 
bound by the doctrine of stare decisis, and not free to assert any 
‘new’ principle.
This situation would be accounted for in the expert system itself by 
not making the principle available if such was the procedural context 
of the user’s case. (It would of course be a simple task for the expert 
system to compare the jurisdiction, and court position, of decided 
cases with that of the NFS, such information, plus the date of the 
decision, being part of the ancillary information attached to the 
factual representation of each recorded case.) If the possibility of 
asserting the principle was not foreclosed by legal doctrine, then the 
opportunity would exist to undermine Mullen, and the expert system 
would make the principle available.
5.2.3.2 Basis of Decision
Another way in which a legally relevant, factually similar, but 
unfavourable case, might be reconciled with a principle, is by arguing 
that the ground of the decision in the case is (or refining the 
principle so that it can be argued that it is), in fact compatible with 
the principle. For example, in Winterbottom v. Wright (1842) 10 M. & 
W. 109, a remedy was denied to the defendant on the ground that the 
claim being made was flawed in law. In this case the defendant 
contracted with the Postmaster-General to provide mail-coaches, and 
to keep the mails in safe condition. Atkinson contracted with the 
Postmaster-General to convey the road mail-coach from Hartford to 
Holyhead. The plaintiff was employed by Atkinson to drive the mail- 
coach. The mail-coach was defective, gave way, and the plaintiff was 
injured. The only right to recovery from the manufacturer alleged was 
one arising out of contract (to put the coach in good repair), i.e. It 
was claimed that because the manufacturer had been negligent in his 
duties under the contract of repair, as a result of which the plaintiff 
was injured, he (the plaintiff) was entitled to recover from the 
manufacturer. It was held that only a party to the contract had rights 
arising from it.
e.g. 4 Winterbottom v. Wright
C1(A,B) C2(B,C) C3(C,D)
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A = manufacturer/defendant i.e. Wright 
B = Postmaster-General 
C = Atkinson
D = plaintiff/injured party i.e. Winterbottom 
C1 = Hire
C2 = Authorised Use 
C3 = Authorised Use
Part of the headnote information of each case is a statement of the 
reason for the decision, e.g. Judgment for the defender because the 
pursuer failed to prove what was required (e.g. negligence) in order to 
establish his case, or (irrespective of whether he could or could not 
prove negligence) because the legal basis of the claim itself was 
invalid. This information, along with (as already discussed) the legal 
issues considered, and a CBR representation of the facts involved, 
would be incorporated into case profiles of each domain case. Thus 
when the system identified Winterbottom v. Wright as relevant, the 
expert would note that the reason for the decision was that in 
W interbottom  the claim was founded, erroneously, on the assertion 
that a right arose out of a contract to which the pursuer was not a 
party, compare it with George v. Skivington, in which it was alleged 
simply that a duty of care is owed by a manufacturer to the person 
for whom the product was intended, and reconcile Winterbottom w ith  
the principle by stating the principle to be one of delict (or tort) 
rather than contract.
The foregoing analysis of how these four cases could be reconciled 
with the principle which, on consequentialist grounds, might be 
considered desirable, reflects what in fact happened in the case of 
Donoghue v. Stevenson. The facts in Donoghue v. Stevenson were 
v irtua lly  identical to Muilen, and when the Court of Session 
considered Donoghue v. Stevenson it followed the decision in Mulien, 
because of the doctrine of stare decisis. The case went to the House 
of Lords, which was not bound by Mullen, but the majority, who 
wanted to find for Mrs. Donoghue, still had to justify a departure 
from it if they wanted to adopt a ‘new’ principle. This they did by 
noting its inconsistency with the underlying case law. Thus when 
asserting the neighbour principle the Lords discounted Mullen, 
explained Winterbottom v. Wright, and advanced George v. Skivington 
and Hawkins v. Smith in support of it (i.e. the principle).
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5.3 Using the Same Cases to Deny a Proposed Principle
However, although those cases were used by the majority to support 
the principle, they could just as easily have been used to deny it, by 
noting that Donoghue v. Stevenson was a Scottish case, and that 
Mullen was the most on point Scottish authority, and that the other 
authorities, being English cases, were distinguishable. This fact 
serves to remind us that once deductive reasoning has failed to 
produce a definite answer, and reasoning by analogy has not returned 
compelling arguments, the court can usually manipulate the relevant 
law to support any principle it wishes to assert, or to support its 
denial. (This p rinc ip le ’s desirab ility  having been determ ined, 
according to MacCorm ick’s theory, through the application of 
consequentialist argument.) Hence the importance, for the purpose of 
building an expert system, of the expert’s initial task of anticipating 
the principle which the courts will want to establish, as the case law 
relevant to a purported principle may often be capable of both 
supporting and denying it.
5.4 Obiter Dicta
When considering a case, judges may also rule on related points of 
law which are not essential to a decision on the point at issue. It is 
accepted that the distinction between the part of the judgment 
essential to the decision on the matter at issue (the ratio decidendi), 
and the ancillary comments (obiter dicta), is often not clear. Hence, 
if the case headnotes were unclear on this matter, or not relied on, 
the expertise of the person (or sophistication of the system), 
interpreting the cases for the purpose of computer representation 
would be vital, and the resulting decisions, as to what is ra t io , and 
what obiter, would, for some cases, necessarily be contentious.
In the case of Winterbottom v. Wright it seems clear that the ground 
on which the pursuer sought to establish a right of recovery against 
the defendant was his (the defendant’s) breach of the contract that he 
(the defendant) had with the Postmaster-General. The majority held 
that only those who are parties to a contract have rights under it, so 
the pursuer could not recover. They also commented that he would 
have no right under tort (delict), i.e. independently of a contract, 
either. These comments could be included in the case profile for
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W interbottom , but noted as obiter dicta.
As already noted, the system could identify Hawkins v. Smith as 
being similar to George v. Skivington, and supporting the principle, 
and Winterbottom v. Wright as being similar to George v. Skivington, 
and unfavourable to the principle. The expert could then reconcile 
Winterbottom with the principle by refining the principle, i.e. noting 
that it should be advanced as a right based arising from delict, not 
contract. However, comments made obiter do carry weight if made by 
respected judges, so if, as just suggested, comments made o b ite r  
were included in the case profiles of cases, the expert would have to 
(further) modify the certainty of his principle being adopted, even if 
based specifically in delict (tort), according to how much authority 
he thought would, in later cases, be attributed to the comments in 
W interbottom.
On the matter of allocating authority to obiter dicta it should be 
noted that if comments which are apparently obiter are supportive of 
the ruling a judge wishes to make, then he may claim that they are in 
fact binding, (implying that he does not regard them as o b ite i). This 
in fact happened in Donoghue v. Stevenson where one of the minority, 
Lord B uckm aster, sp e c ifica lly  adopted the com m ents in 
Winterbottom as a ground for denying the neighbour principle. Some 
may say that this illustrates the reality of the uncertainty which 
may sometimes exist over what is ratio, and what is obiter, and 
consequentially the necessary contentiousness (or even futility), of 
any attempt to specifically delimit them. Others may say that it just 
illustrates that a judge may try to cloud the distinction between 
comments made obiter, and the ratio decidendi, if it suits his 
purpose. Whichever view is true, it certainly does emphasise the 
im portance, and d ifficu lty , of the expert’s task of correctly 
anticipating the essentially subjective consequentialist arguments of 
the judges, concerning whether to support or deny a particular 
principle. This is emphasised because the only reason that Lord 
Buckmaster advanced the comments made o b ite r  in W interbottom  
was because his consequentialist evaluation of the proposed principle 
had led him to wish to deny it.
Therefore given the proposal of a principle on manufacturers’ 
liab ility  the expert would have to foresee that there were 
consequentialist arguments against adopting the principle which 
might be advanced, and also that the denial of the principle could be
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supported by the case law. He would then have to weigh these 
considerations against those which supported the principle, and 
reflect his deliberations in the certainty factor attached to it.
Of course remarks made obiter in cases such as Winterbottom  would 
have to be weighed in the context of the relevant cases as a whole. 
Thus even if made by an important judge their authority would be 
diminished the more similar cases were decided on the opposite view 
of the law, particularly if such decisions were made at the highest 
level, and in recent years, e.g. Oliver v. Sadler & Co. 1929 S.C. (H.L.) 
94; [1929] A.C. 584. A firm of stevedores and a porterage company
were employed to unload a cargo of bags of maize. The stevedores 
used there own rope slings to raise the cargo to the ship’s deck, and 
permitted the porterage company to use those slings in transporting 
the cargo to the quay. A sling broke while bags were being 
transported to the quay and the bags it contained fell and killed an 
employee of the porterage company. Held, the stevedore company 
owed a duty to the porters to see that the slings were fit for use, 
which they failed to discharge.
5.5 Unreconcilable Cases
In any domain there may be cases which simply cannot be reconciled 
with a proposed principle. Smith discovered this when building the 
Nervous Shock Advisor. The system would identify such contrary 
cases (along with the other legally relevant, factually similar cases, 
which were reconcilable), and the expert would have to modify the 
certainty factor attached to the principle according to how much 
importance he thought would be ascribed to them. For example, he 
might decide they were simply wrongly decided (which seems to be 
be Smith’s view on the contrary cases in the domain of nervous 
shock), and attach very little weight to them, on the basis that the 
court would do all it could to avoid being bound by them.
5.6 Procedural Context
A further refinement to the task of reconciling a principle with the 
case law which may be proposed here is that the expert should 
consider the procedural, or jud ic ia l, contexts in which he 
contemplates his principle being advanced, and determ ine the
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‘precedential pedigree’ of the relevant unreconcilable contrary 
precedents (and perhaps also that of the favourable ones), as part of 
the task of deciding how much authority he thought would be accorded 
to these cases, and its effect on the princ ip le ’s chances of 
succeeding. The precedential pedigree would be determined by 
weighting the formal parameters of jurisdiction, level of court, and 
age. (On weighting these parameters see earlier discussion of the 
Malicious Prosecution Consultant in section 2.2. As evidence of the 
success of the Malicious Prosecution Consultant’s weighting scheme, 
it m ight be noted that Deedman and Smith are intending to 
incorporate it into the Nervous Shock Advisor.66) The consideration 
would result in (for example), lessening the certainty of a principle 
in relation to a particular procedural context (i.e. court and 
jurisdiction) in which that principle might be advanced, the greater 
the authority of a particular unfavourable, unreconcilable precedent 
relative to that procedural context.
The consequence of the expert undertaking such a consideration is 
that he would have an extra factor to take into account when 
determining the certainty factors for each version of the principle. 
(The versions reflecting different levels of generality.) Moreover, 
there would no longer be just one certainty factor associated with a 
particular version, rather it would vary depending on the procedural 
context of the the NFS presented to the expert system. For example, 
if the NFS concerned an action being raised in the House of Lords, on 
appeal from the Court of Session, and the only unreconcilable case 
occurred in the Court of Exchequer in England, then the certainty of 
the principle would be higher than if the action was being raised in 
the House of Lords, on appeal from the English Court of Appeal, and 
the only unreconcilable case was another Lords case, heard on appeal 
from the Court of Session.
If the certainty of the principle which was determined, when the 
expert system was informed of the procedural context of the NFS, 
was low enough, then it might be wise to regard the principle as 
completely untenable, and not make it available for that NFS. This 
would cover the aforementioned suggestion that it would have been 
pointless to have tried to advance a principle on manufacturers’ 
liability, which was contrary to the decision in Mullen, in the Court 
of Session, because the court would have been bound by the doctrine
55 Deedman, C. & Smith, J. C. The Nervous Shock Advisor: A Legal Expert System in
Case-based Law. (paper) p. 19
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of stare decisis.
However, as regards a case arising in the House of Lords, and there 
existing contrary Lords decisions, it might still be advisable to make 
the principle available, as the Lords do not regard themselves as 
bound by there own decisions, though they believe there must be good 
reason for a departure. Thus if the expert’s consequentialist 
evaluation, and knowledge of the general legal trend, suggested a very 
high certainty factor for a principle, he should not modify it too much 
in contemplation of a NFS arising in the House of Lords, even though 
there existed contrary Lords decisions, on the basis that they would 
regard the contrary decisions as being jus t one of their 
considerations (but not a decisive one), when reaching a judgment. 
Again support for this view can be seen in the recent House of Lords 
English decision on marital rape.
5.7 Parallel between Framing a Principle, and Generating a 
GFR
Obviously the expert’s in itia l speculation of a ‘ rough’ general 
principle, from his knowledge of the domain case law (noted earlier, 
at the beginning of this chapter, as the starting point in any attempt 
to incorporate unarticulated principles into an expert system), 
possibly at various levels of generality, entails a generalisation from 
the facts of the specific relevant cases he is aware of to more 
general terms. As alluded to earlier (in section 4.5), this parallels 
the proposal (in section 2.3), of generalising from the fact(s) of a 
specific precedent, to a GFR, for the purpose of arguing that a new 
case and the precedent are sufficiently similar for it to be necessary 
for the precedent’s result to be followed. The difference for a 
principle is that the generalisation would be made from the facts of 
more than one precedent, and that the principle (or general rule) 
itself would provide the reason, or ‘ legal warrant’ , that a particular 
result should be given.
5.8 Lack of Distinction between ‘Argument by Analogy’, and 
‘Argument from Principle’
The similarity, between the two generalisation processes required to 
build into an expert system the ability to argue by analogy, using a
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GFR, and the ability to argue from principle, seems to tie in with 
MacCormick’s observation,67 that there is no clear line between 
‘argument by analogy’, and ‘argument from principle’ . For example, 
suppose an expert was trying to formulate a principle to cover the 
right of recovery of a party injured while trying to prevent the 
damage which would result from another party’s wrongful act (or 
that of someone for whom the latter was responsible). In the light of 
the settled law, that a person injured while saving another person 
endangered by the wrongful act of a third party is entitled to 
recompense from the latter (e.g. Woods v. Caledonian Rly. (1886) 13 R. 
1118, Wilkinson v. Kinneil Cannel & Coking Co. (1897) 24 R. 1001), 
and his knowledge of the trend in the law of reparations, the expert 
might suggest a principle by generalising from ‘saving a person’ to 
‘saving a person or his property’. Alternatively he might generalise 
from just one of the cases to produce a GFR to the same effect with a 
GF of course attached to the resultant generalisation.
MacCormick illustrates the similarity between ‘argument by analogy’ 
and ‘argument from principle’ with the case of Steel v. Glasgow Iron 
and Steel Co. Ltd. 1944 S.C. 237, in which the court ‘found’ the 
principle just suggested in the case law, but talked about analogy 
(which is what a GFR would support). In the S tee l case the guard of a 
shunting train was killed while trying to save the property of the 
defender, endangered due to the carelessness of an employee of the 
defender. There was no directly on point authority, but the majority 
decided there was suffic ient analogy between saving life, the 
situation in the precedents, and saving property, the situation in the 
instant case, (they said the two were different in degree, not in 
k ind),68 to find a principle covering both, and thus give the pursuer a 
remedy.
(If the expert had proposed a principle this ‘difference in degree’ 
would be reflected in the ‘level of generality acceptable’ part of the 
certainty factor attached to the principle. He would know that the 
level of risk to which the injured party had voluntarily exposed 
himself, in attempting to prevent the damage, which would be 
acceptable to the court, would be greater if life was involved, rather 
than merely property. If he had produced a GFR this difference of 
degree would be reflected in the GF.)
*' LRLT, p. 161
6a ref. 67, p. 162
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5.9 GFRs and Principles
This similarity of the expert system construction tasks of generating 
a GFR, for the purpose of reasoning by analogy, and forming a 
principle, for reasoning from principles, plus this example from 
MacCormick of the potential for the court to cloud the distinction 
between the two processes, raises the question of whether there is 
any real distinction between a GFR and a principle. To answer this 
question it is worth noting firstly that the GFR was conceived as a 
way to implement one aspect of reasoning by analogy, (it can be 
viewed as a supplement to the HYPO type of CBR, see chapter 3, or as 
one aspect of GREBE like CBR, termed ‘case elaboration’), and then to 
examine how, or whether, one can remain faithful to MacCormick’s 
comment that there is no clear dividing line between the two 
reasoning process in a case like S tee l, and justify the need to 
maintain the GFR, and the principle, as two distinct entities in an 
expert system.
If a ‘right of recovery’ principle had been formulated by the expert 
and the principle-cases reconciliation system, in the way I have 
outlined in this chapter, then the relevant, favourable cases would 
have been identified, and the possibility of arguing that they were 
analogous to the NFS would simply be a by-product of the fact that 
the principle already (factually) subsumed them, and must also 
(factually) subsume the NFS, in order to be advancable. Thus the 
reconciliation system would reflect the fact that if one is ‘arguing 
from principle’ , it is always going to be possible to ‘argue by 
analogy’, as a principle is based on previous cases, and to be usable 
must subsume the current case. So the expert system would deal with 
a scenario like S tee l by reasoning with principles, although the 
argument produced could also be interpreted as an argument by 
analogy, and that argument could be substantiated by referencing the 
precedents which supported the principle. The final certainty factor 
computed for the principle (resulting from a combination of the 
expert’s assessments) would indicate the likelihood of the principle 
being accepted in a NFS, but could also be viewed as the likelihood 
that the relevant precedents would be considered sufficiently 
analogous to the NFS for the court to be bound by their outcomes.
This might suggest that by formulating principles one is forestalling 
the need to generate GFRs, as by identifying a principle one probably
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embraces the analogical arguments which a GFR would support. 
However, a GFR is perceived as involving a smaller degree of 
generalisation than a principle, the method of generating it is 
simpler than what is required for a principle, its purpose is more 
limited, and as a consequence of these factors the chances of it 
providing useful advice are probably greater. As already noted, it 
would be generated from a single case (rule), and not require the 
same process of case law reconciliation as a principle, because it 
would not involve the same degree of generalisation. It’s purpose is 
primarily intended to be to suggest the likelihood of a match between 
a particular precedent case rule, and a few possible NFSs, being 
accepted, (by suggesting an argument by analogy to advance where 
deductive reasoning has faltered), and not to provide a more 
tentative, broad argument, capable of embracing many possible 
scenarios, which is the purpose of a principle.
Consequently I would say that, as far as the type of expert system I 
am proposing is concerned, ‘argument by analogy’ can be distinct from 
‘argument from principle’ , because argument by analogy can involve 
the use of a GFR, and a GFR is a distinct entity from a principle, 
although the two are related. On the other hand, an argument from 
principle can always be interpreted as an argument by analogy. 
Finally, just to reinforce the answer, to the question posed at the 
start of the section, I would say that GFRs and principles are clearly 
distinguishable, both in the procedure required to form them, and in 
the use to which they would be put.
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Chapter 6
Representation and Utilisation of Principles and 
Cases
6.1 Representing a Principle
It is proposed that the expert’s refined and reconciled domain 
principles would be represented in the expert system simply as 
individual, unrelated rules, each with a certainty factor (reflecting 
the expert’s evaluation of the criteria previously discussed), and 
references to profiles (see later) of the relevant cases.
6.2 Satisfying the Components of a Principle
A principle would contain a combination of any, or all, of simple 
facts, open textured legal phrases, and legal concepts defined (by the 
expert), in terms of a necessary and sufficient set of facts. For 
example, the principle on manufacturers’ liab ility might contain 
facts and an open textured phrase, viz. ‘ If a manufacturer fails to 
take reasonable care in the production of his product and the ultimate 
user is harmed as a result then he (the manufacturer) is liable in 
damages to that user.’ Principles in other domains might contain 
definable legal concepts, such as ‘estate’, or ‘theft’, which Smith 
considers. In the expert system a ‘principle based reasoner’, a 
program distinct from both the rule based reasoner and the case 
based reasoner, would be used to determine whether any of the 
principles, contained in a principles knowledge base (PKB), were 
satisfied by the NFS.
6.2.1 Facts
The principle based reasoner’s first step in trying to satisfy a 
principle would be to examine the user’s NFS to see if the necessary 
facts were present. As the user would have already described his NFS 
to the system for the purpose of RBR, and CBR, (see section 7.1 on 
NFS entry), all the relevant information would probably be available
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by the time the principle base reasoner was invoked. This information 
would be used either for direct matching, or for inferred matching 
using the domain hierarchy discussed earlier, which would contain 
the factual terms used in the principles, e.g. The principle based 
reasoner would need to establish that there was a manufacturer of a 
product. In the NFS the relationship of ‘manufactures’, might already 
have been established between the objects ‘manufacturer’, and ‘car’. 
A simple and certain inference would then be made from ‘car’ to 
‘product’ to establish that there is a manufacturer who manufactures 
a product. (Note that the inference here would be certain because 
there is no semantic uncertainty involved, e.g. a ‘car’ is definitely a 
‘product’; and because the purpose of the inference is not to try to 
establish the likelihood that a case based rule which concerned car 
would be broadened to include products in general, i.e. the purpose is 
not to generate a GFR, but merely to use the common sense knowledge 
that a car is a type of product. (Although it is arguable that the 
certainty should not be quite one hundred percent as the court may 
choose to define product restrictively, i.e. give it a particular legal 
definition for this principle which would exclude vehicles.) The user 
would then be expressly questioned about any of the principle’s facts 
whose presence or absence was not ascertainable from the NFS 
descrip tion.
6.2.2 Legal Concepts
Definable legal concepts would be included in the domain hierarchy, 
and therein refined to the level of simple, or in MacCormick’s 
term inology ‘brute’ ,68 facts, in accordance with both MacCormick’s 
and Smith’s theories (see section 4.2). The principle based reasoner’s 
initial approach to the task of trying to satisfy concepts would again 
be to examine the NFS for satisfaction of the relevant facts, and if 
that was not sufficient, to question the user. The inclusion of legal 
concepts (or ‘institutional’ facts as MacCormick calls them), as well 
as simple facts, in the domain hierarchy, would result in a structure 
which would parallel closely the sophistication of GREBE’S own 
hierarchy of objects, as can be seen from the speculative examples 
given in section 5.2.3.1 (see figure 3). The utility of such a domain 
hierarchy, both for the construction and the functioning of the 
proposed expert system, should hopefully now be apparent. It would 
be used for GREBE like CBR when trying to reconcile cases with
69 MacCormick, D. N. Law as Institutional Fact. Law Quarterly Review, 1974, Vol. 90, p. 102
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proposed principles before incorporating them into the system, for 
the generation of GFRs when doing RBR in the system, possibly for 
CBR when using the system if GREBE’S form of CBR was found to be 
more suitable for the domain in question than HYPO’s, and for trying 
to match principles to the NFS when doing PBR. This general utility of 
the structure suggests that it should be carefully created right at the 
start of building the system, before any other task was undertaken.
6.2.3 Open Textured Phrases
If the principle incorporated vague legal phrases, such as ‘reasonable 
care’, or ‘negligence’, (in the production of goods), then, as when such 
issues arose in a statute based, or case derived rule of law, more 
than one approach could be employed. The simplest, and arguably the 
least satisfactory approach is simply to ask the user if he thinks the 
phrase is satisfied in his NFS. However, although some researchers 
have criticised this approach as being unsatisfactory, it is worth 
noting that questioning the user about the satisfaction of such a term 
as ‘negligence’ is not apparently regarded as unsatisfactory by 
Deedman and Smith; this they do in the Nervous Shock Advisor.
Presumably they would justify this approach by observing that the
intended user of their system is a lawyer, and that as lawyers
themselves they are in the best position to judge whether or not a 
lawyer is well enough equipped to make such an assessment. 
However, another open textured term, which they perhaps regard as 
more domain/context sensitive, they do not leave to the user to
determ ine satisfaction. Consequently there is another approach 
employed in the Nervous Shock Advisor, whereby Deedman and Smith, 
due to their deep structure analysis, have identified a group of facts 
which satisfy the term ‘reasonably foreseeable’ , as it relates to 
nervous shock, and the system simply questions the user about them.70 
(I would suggest that these facts could be expanded to 
generalisations, and coupled with GFs, to cover analogous situations 
in the manner suggested earlier when discussing GFRs.) This approach 
of Deedman and Smith seems akin to Branting’s notion of reasoning 
with portions of precedents, in which the specific facts in a relevant 
case (or cases) which satisfy an open textured phrase have been 
identified, and a case based reasoner attempts to establish the
75 Deedman, C. & Smith, J. C. The Nervous Shock Advisor: A Legal Expert System in 
Case-based Law. (paper) pp. 4-5
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phrase as satisfied in the NFS by matching only those facts.71 This 
CBR technique of Branting’s constitutes another approach to the task 
of satisfying an open textured term in a principle. (Again, I would 
claim  that the possib ility of generalising the facts in those 
precedential portions exists.)
To illustrate the idea of reasoning with portions of precedents one 
might consider the simple rule based system suggested in chapter 2 
(see figure 1) for dealing with straightforward cases like Daniels. 
The case of Grant contains two open textured phrases intended by 
Lord Wright to clarify what is meant by ‘unmerchantable’ , viz. 
‘defects unfitting a thing for its only proper use’ which are ‘not 
apparent on ordinary examination’. From the cases two different sets 
of facts might be identified as satisfying these terms, e.g. A foreign 
substance, in a bottle of drink, which causes sickness to the 
consumer, is a ‘defect unfitting a thing for its only proper use’; a non 
discolouring foreign substance, in a sealed bottle of drink, is a defect 
which is ‘not apparent on ordinary examination’. Both of these 
precedent constituents were in fact elements of Daniels, but the 
point is that in order for a NFS to satisfy either of the terms, it 
would not be necessary for it to match all the facts of Daniels, but 
merely those that had been identified as satisfying the term in that 
case. Moreover, it might be the case that the NFS only matched one of 
those term definitions in Daniels, but as regards the other term, it 
matched an alternative definition in another precedent. In such a 
situation satisfaction of the two open textured term s (and
consequently the subsuming term ‘unm erchantable’), would be 
achieved by matching with portions of different precedents, which is 
what Branting illustrates.72
I propose that when the problem of vague concepts arises in
principles, then, as with statutory or case derived rules, the best 
idea is to use a combined approach. Thus, for example, Donoghue v. 
Stevenson could provide a factual description, or precedent 
constituent example, of the non satisfaction of the phrase
‘reasonable care in manufacturer’, which a NFS like Daniels would 
fail to match. If it failed to match any of the other precedent
constituent examples of the satisfaction, or non satisfaction, of the
a) Branting, L. K. Reasoning with Portions of Precedents. ICAIL-91, p. 147
b) Branting, L. K. & Porter, B. W. Rules and Precedents as Complementary Warrants. 
(paper for AAAI-91) p. 8
72 ref. 71, p. 147
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phrase, (and possibly even if it did), the user would then be allowed 
to decide for himself what he thought a judge would decide. (One 
might also suggest that where the authority on a particular term is 
sparse, an expert should form hypothetical examples of its 
satisfaction, and non satisfaction, with certainty factors to indicate 
his confidence in them, to assist the user in his assessment.)
6.3 Identifying all the Principles applicable to a NFS
As previously discussed (in section 4.4), the domain principles the 
expert would articulate might be formed at d ifferent levels of 
generality, and the likelihood of a principle succeeding would be 
greater the less general it was in relation to the NFS. Therefore, 
when invoked, the principle based reasoner would examine all the 
principles in the PKB, and identify the most specific version of any 
principle which the NFS satisfied. For this task the domain hierarchy 
would be used. For example, based on the cases favourable to the 
principle on manufacturers’ liability which I noted at the start of the 
chapter (in section 6.2), the most specific version of that principle 
which the expert could form might have contained the phrase ‘product 
intended for use by an individual’, (i.e. Given the cases of George v. 
Skivington, where defective shampoo was involved, Hawkins v. 
Smith, where a defective sack was involved, and Oliver v. Sadler & 
Co., involving a defective rope sling, this would be the most certain 
version of the principle the expert could generate.) A more general 
version, which he might have speculated, could have employed simply 
‘product’, as I originally suggested. A specialisation of ‘product’ (not 
found in the cases) could be ‘product for public use’. Thus if the NFS 
had involved an accident on public transport, the user would have 
satisfied this latter phrase when questioned about his problem. The 
NFS would not have matched the case facts (hence CBR would not 
produce a strong argument), but the principle based reasoner would 
infer satisfaction of the more general version of the principle, 
speculated by the expert, and this would be presented to the user as 
the most specific principle which he may argue as embracing his case 
(it being a generalisation of the most specific version discernible).
This version of the principle would of course have a certainty factor 
attached to it, indicating the expert’s certainty that the court would 
want to adopt the principle, and would want to adopt it at this level 
of generality. However, if the specialisation ‘product for public use’
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had not been added to the hierarchy by the expert, then the user would 
have been questioned simply about the generic term ‘product’ when 
inputting his NFS. In such a situation he may be allowed, as discussed 
under GFRs, to attach a certainty factor to his response to reflect 
(semantic) uncertainty, e.g. over whether the court would want 
‘product’ to subsume ‘public transport’ . (As with GFRs, this would 
affect the certainty of the satisfaction of the condition of the 
principle which the phrases concerned. This would in turn affect the 
certainty of the principle’s conclusion. The final certainty value 
would indicate the certainty of its application (to the NFS), not the 
certainty of its acceptance by the court as a valid principle. This is 
what the expert’s certainty assessments alone would indicate.)
Thus the most specific versions of any principles which the user’s 
NFS satisfied would be determined, plus certainty factors indicating 
the likelihood of those versions succeeding. When presenting those 
(versions of) principles, and certainty factors, to the user, the 
principle based reasoner would also present the expert’s reasons for 
his assessments, stored with the principles, plus, if required, the 
cases relevant to the principles, and accounts of how they were 
reconciled with the principles, which would be stored in the CKB. The 
user would of course be free to view less specific versions, but the 
certa inty factors would be less. Potentially conflicting principles 
would be identified, but hopefully their certa inty factors would 
differ thus suggesting which were most likely to succeed.
6.4 Case Profiles Construction and Utilisation
It is proposed that each potentially relevant domain case would be 
represented by a case profile, in which would be stored its critical 
facts, in a formalism suitable for CBR, plus other necessary 
information such as the legal issues involved, verdict, reason for the 
decision, and ‘precedential pedigree’ details. The method of obtaining, 
and use of, each of these items has already been discussed in the 
course of the preceding chapters. Here I will relate the items to the 
construction and use of the case profiles themselves.
The aforementioned information, necessary for each case profile, 
would be extracted from the raw texts either in the usual manual 
way, or hopefully, by employing a text analysis facility like that of 
FLEXICON to automatically identify it. The factual information would
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be cast into a GREBE like representation, and this would be a manual 
task unless the analysis which identified the critical facts also 
identified their relationships inter se. The legal phrases used to 
describe legal issues, and employed in the reasons for the decisions, 
would be linked to a synonym index to enable comparison of these 
matters between the cases (and with the proposed principles), e.g. 
‘Failure to take reasonable care’ in production, m ight be the 
expression used in one case, whereas ‘negligence’ in production could 
be used in another.
Using these case profiles the principle-cases reconciliation system 
would enable the expert to attempt to reconcile the cases with a 
proposed principle, and if necessary refine the principle, in the 
manner discussed in the preceding chapter. Then, for each case, an 
account of the way in which the reconciliation was achieved would be 
appended to its profile, (e.g. ‘This case supports the principle because 
it is subsumable under it, and has the required outcome’, or, ‘Though 
unfavourable to the principle this case is arguably reconcilable with 
it because the following facts make it distinguishable from any of 
the favourable cases, and the wording/ambit of the principle does not 
subsume it.’ Or, for a contrary, unreconcilable case, ‘this authority 
contradicts the principle, but, in the opinion of the expert, is likely 
to be viewed as wrongly decided.*). The resulting profiles would 
constitute the CKB to be used by the expert system. Thus one CKB 
could serve both the principle-cases reconciliation system, and the 
expert system itself; in the expert system the case based reasoner 
would use the representations of the facts of the cases, and the 
principle based reasoner would use the reconciliation accounts 
produced by the principle-cases reconciliation system.
6.5 Use of the Principle Based Reasoner
The user would be encouraged to invoke the principle based reasoner, 
to ascertain what principles might be argued as applicable to his 
case, after the rule based reasoner, and then the case based reasoner, 
had been invoked. This would accord with the way in which a lawyer 
works. First see if a straightforward deductive (fairly incontestable) 
outcome can be predicted, as determined by unambiguous statutory 
rules, and clear, authoritative case based rules (see the section on 
rule based reasoning). Then, if deductive reasoning proves inadequate, 
see what support reasoning with cases (by analogy; GFRs and CBR) can
70
lend to each side’s argument. Finally, if there is still the slightest 
element of doubt over what outcome the primary sources support, ( 
and ideally, even if there appears to be no doubt), see if appeal to 
principle might support either side. This exhortation, that one should 
always see what arguments appeal to principle can produce, even if 
the case seems clearly determinable by deductive reasoning, or 
analogical reasoning, is merely a way of paying heed to MacCormick’s 
observation that the majority of cases do not fall neatly into either 
the ‘clear’, or ‘hard’, case categories.
6.6 User Projection of Principles
I have proposed that the expert should identify potential domain 
principles (and build them into the system). As noted (in chapter 4), 
unlike a court, he would be performing the formulation task out of the 
context of a specific case. Therefore it might be the case that the 
principles he produced failed to cover a particular NFS. A more 
contentious idea would be to allow the user himself to speculate as 
to possible principles when actually running the expert system. It is 
contentious because unless he was himself (or had access to), a 
domain expert, he would be unlikely to make a good assessment of the 
likely acceptance of his projections. That is the disadvantage of this 
idea. The advantage of it is that he would be trying to construct a 
principle knowing the factual scenario (i.e. his NFS), which it was to 
cover, which is of course what judges do.
In outline this idea would work as follows. Having described his NFS 
to the system, and it finding no relevant statutory or case based 
rules, and CBR failing to identify very on point cases, the user would 
be allowed direct access to the domain hierarchy. The (most specific) 
terms in the hierarchy which his NFS satisfied would already have 
been established, and from them the user would be able to undertake 
generalisation inferencing in the hierarchy, identifying what he 
believed the court would perceive as generic terms (which could be 
simple facts, or legal concepts), which could constitute a principle. 
These generic terms would subsume other specific terms which, if 
present in other precedents, would identify cases which could be 
argued as analogous to the NFS, and subsumed by the principle, if 
advancing the principle. These arguably factually similar precedents 
would be retrieved by a (GREBE like) case based reasoner, which 
would use the specific terms subsumed by the generic terms the user
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had selected as a sort of ‘new’ (or analogous) NFS, for which matches 
were to be sought among the domain cases.
To illustrate this idea, using the example parts of a domain hierarchy 
proposed in figure 3, suppose that part of the user’s NFS involved a 
Person; he might generalise to a principle involving Legal Bodies, and 
if so the case based reasoner would look for precedents involving 
Companies, as well as Persons. It would ultimately be up to the user 
to assess the likelihood of the court regarding as analogous any case 
identified as arguably similar to the NFS, through inferencing in the 
hierarchy and CBR, when trying to form a principle, (although the GFs 
attached to links in the GFH, for identifying GFRs, might be of some 
assistance to him in this task, see chapter 2).
Having identified cases which were arguably analogous to the NFS, 
and subsumed by his proposed principle, the user would then have to 
reconcile them with the principle. At this point the principle-cases 
reconciliation system would be used to assist him in explaining away 
unfavourable cases (in the same way as it is proposed it would assist 
the expert), although obviously distinguishing would not be an option, 
unless his generalisations had only been made from some of the 
critical facts in his NFS. The precedential weight of the relevant 
cases would be determined (using their precedential pedigree details, 
and comparing them to the procedural context of the NFS), and would 
be an important consideration, as not being an expert the user could 
not afford to be as confident as an expert could about the court 
s im ply overrid ing au tho rita tive , unfavourab le , unreconcilab le 
precedents.
Perhaps the most important point about this idea of user constructed 
principles is that it would allow him to identify the generalisations 
of his facts which subsumed those cases which would best support 
his claim. Thus if one set of generalisations (i.e. a ‘principle’), 
resulted in too many unfavourable, unreconcilable cases being 
identified as potentially analogous, he could try a variation of those 
generalisations. However he would constantly have to reevaluate the 
chances of his proposed principle being accepted by the court, even if 
reconcilable with the case law, basing his assessment on the same 
criteria as the expert would use. i.e. Knowledge of trends in the 
domain law, and appraisal of judicial consequentialist evaluation, and 
of the level of generality at which the principle would be accepted.
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As noted, this idea of the user creating principles would have the 
advantage that it would allow a principle to be formed knowing the 
NFS it was to cover, this being a consequence of the fact that the 
principle was being formed while using the expert system. To put it 
another way, the best time to form a principle would be when using 
the system. It has also been noted that the best person to form a 
principle is an expert. Therefore, one might conclude, that the best 
person to use the system would be an expert, (which some might say 
defeats its purpose).
6.7 Other Domain Principles
The above discussion on principles in this chapter has mainly 
concerned, as the whole previous discussion has, those speculative 
‘new’ principles formulated by the expert, which he believes will be 
accepted by the court. However the PKB would also contain those 
principles he has identified as potentially conflicting, and regarding 
which he has assessed the court’s likely preference, plus relevant 
principles which are clearly established, and uncontentious, and the 
principles based reasoner would attempt to apply them to the NFS in 
the same way as the others.
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Chapter 7
Factual Descriptions of Cases
7.1 New Fact Situation entry
The domain expert would decide on a basic set of factual terms, and 
it would provide the basic level of representational detail at which 
each domain case, stored in the CKB, could be described. To obtain a 
description of the the NFS a menu-driven case editor would be 
invoked at the start of the expert system consultation, primarily to 
obtain all the information required for RBR, and it could be reinvoked 
if required if additional information was needed by the case based 
reasoner or principle based reasoner. The determination of a complete 
factual description of the NFS prior to processing is of course 
necessary for CBR, however most rule based reasoners simply acquire 
factual information as required in the course of inferencing. The 
reason I suggest that a full account be obtained right at the start of 
the consultation is so that all possible rule based arguments would 
be identified, not just the first one the facts satisfy, which is what 
conventional rule based processing achieves. This is desirable 
because a lawyer should use all possible lines of attack, and must be 
aware of all possible counter arguments.
The actual means of entry of individual items of information would 
follow the conventional practice of requiring the user to respond to 
system queries so that it could establish his knowledge about certain 
matters, or obtain factual information. Where it was possible to 
avoid a number of detailed questions by asking a more general one 
this would of course be done, however, whenever the user was 
uncertain about the answer, the subsumed, detailed questions would 
need to be presented. Additionally, even if a particular detailed set of 
factual questions was avoided when RBR, it might be necessary to ask 
them later for the task of CBR.
7.2 Problem of Grain Size
At this point some observations should be made about the level of
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detail at which cases would be described to, and represented in, the 
expert system. Ideally, the specific facts of every precedent, and the 
NFS, would be recorded. In practice there would be (or a least there is 
in present systems), a limit to how specifically any case could be
described (i.e. as noted above, there would be a basic level of terms
which would constitute the greatest level of detail at which any case 
could be described), and this could cause problems.
For example, suppose a system was operating in the area of law in 
which the Rylands and Read cases arose, i.e. that concerning the
liability of a person in charge of a dangerous substance to those
harmed by it (see section 4.7). Suppose the Read scenario was in fact 
the NFS presented to the system. Unless the expert had decided that 
the fact that the harm in Rylands occurred outside the defendant’s 
property was a relevant factor, the location of the harm might not be 
included in a case rule derived from the case, or a CBR representation 
of its facts, and the question of where the harm occurred in the NFS 
(Read scenario) would not be asked of the user. (The harm actually 
occurred on the defendant’s property in Read.) The consequence of 
this is that the rule based reasoner might establish that the NFS 
satisfied the case rule, or the case based reasoner might find that 
Rylands and the NFS were very analogous. Thus, when the system 
noted that ‘strict liab ility ’ was established in Rylands, it would 
predict ‘strict liability’ as the most likely outcome in the NFS (the 
Read scenario), i.e. it would advise judgment for the plaintiff, 
whereas the verdict actually given in Read was for the defendant.
However, it is possible that if the system user then invoked the 
principle based reasoner, it would identify the ‘strict liability’ , and 
‘no liab ility without fau lt’ principles as potentially relevant, and 
that the later might have the highest certainty factor (assuming the 
expert had correctly assessed the legal trend, and consequentialist 
arguments). The user would then have to examine the cases himself, 
to identify a factual disparity which the expert system had failed to 
reveal due to its level of representational detail, and which the 
courts might highlight (as in fact they did in Read ), in order to 
achieve the end they desired.
This hypothetical example is intended to illustrate the problem 
facing the expert, and knowledge engineer, when deciding to what 
level of detail to go when developing a case description language for 
the domain. It also hopefully illustrates the utility of modelling
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principles, and why the user should always invoke the principle based 
reasoner when using the system, as the advice based on principles 
may conflict with that produced from applying RBR or CBR to the NFS, 
and that advice may alert the user to the possible inadequacies of 
these forms of reasoning.
Ideally an expert system would be capable of representing every 
legally significant fact, but as the law is an ever evolving entity the 
importance of the critical ones is often not apparent until the judges 
decide to accord them legal significance, (e.g. the question of where 
the harm was suffered was not considered important before the Read 
case arose), and one cannot expect an expert to be able to anticipate 
every such ‘yet to become important’ fact. Thus I would question the 
utility  of producing a complete factual representation of every 
domain case, even if it was achievable, as that would not achieve an 
identification of the critical facts. It is much more useful to identify 
the applicable principles, which reflect the relevant legal trends.
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Chapter 8
A Principle-Cases Reconciliation System and Expert 
System based on MacCormick’s Theory
8.1 Modelling MacCormick’s ideas
To bring together the observations made in the proceeding chapters, I 
now propose that an attempt to model, computationally, the ideas 
Neil MacCormick expresses in ‘Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory’ , 
using the currently available Al techniques, might involve the 
following three stages.
8.2 Stage One
Stage one would involve the follow ing. The construction of a 
semantic network domain hierarchy of facts and legal concepts 
(which would subsume a hierarchy of facts alone, i.e. the GFH). The 
construction of case pro files, contain ing GREBE like CBR 
representations of the facts, plus additional case information, which 
would constitute a CKB. The construction of a synonym index of legal 
phrases present in the domain. The construction of a RKB, comprised 
of legal rules, extracted from the statutes and cases. (Although the 
construction of the RKB could be delayed until the end of stage two, 
as it would not be used by the principle-cases reconciliation system.) 
These structures would serve the systems used in the following two 
stages.
8.3 Stage Two
The construction of a principle-cases reconciliation system, which 
would do the following. Retrieve domain cases which considered the 
legal issues relevant to the proposed principles, employing the 
synonym index while carrying out this task. Use GREBE’S form of CBR 
in order to identify, and also to try to actively create, factually 
sim ilarity (or dissim ilarity), between cases. Employ a weighting 
scheme (such as that developed at UBC), to assess the ‘precedential
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pedigree’ of relevant precedents, relative to possible procedural 
contexts. Supplement the case profiles (i.e. the CKB) with the 
precedential weightings, plus accounts of how proposed principles 
had been reconciled with the cases. Store the refined (versions of) 
principles, plus their certainty factors, plus the reasons for those 
certainty factors (i.e., for each principle, reference to any relevant, 
contrary, unreconcilable cases whose precedential weight made the 
principle untenable, or extremely unlikely to succeed, in a particular 
procedural context; and the expert’s reasons for his certainty 
assessments), in a PKB. Link each principle to the case profiles 
relevant to it.
8.4 Stage Three
The development of an expert system, which would be composed of a 
rule based reasoner, a case based reasoner, and a principle based 
reasoner. The rule based reasoner would reason deductively by 
performing RBR on the RKB of statutory and case derived rules, and 
perform generalisation and specialisation inferencing in the domain 
hierarchy. (Although when discussing deductive reasoning I 
illustrated generalising and specialising in the context of a simple 
GFR, it is more realistic to envisage the rule based reasoner using the 
entire domain hierarchy, as a legal rule can contain legal concepts.) 
Inferencing in the domain hierarchy, to identify generic rules, would 
be the technique the rule based reasoner would use when the NFS 
failed to match specific condition terms of a rule in the RKB for 
which the expert had proposed generalisations. When there was 
uncertainty over whether a rule condition was satisfied, due to the 
open texture of a phrase it contained (whether the rule was one of 
those contained in the RKB, or a generic rule), then the rule based 
reasoner would pass control to the case based reasoner.
The case based reasoner would identify the best arguments for and 
against an open textured phrase being held satisfied in a NFS, by 
attempting to match to, and distinguish from, the NFS, the domain 
cases (contained in the CKB) which ruled on that phrase. The type of 
CBR it would employ to produce these ‘arguments by analogy’ would 
depend on the nature of the domain involved, and the degree of 
sophistication decided on for the reasoner. If the nature of the 
domain was such that there were quite readily identifiable, and 
maybe fairly fixed in number, groups of facts, whose intra group
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relationships were also fairly rigid, and if the presence or absence of 
those groups unequivocally strengthened, or weakened, the claims the 
system was to advise on, in other words if HYPO ‘factors’ were 
identifiable, then the simpler, less flexible, HYPO form of CBR might 
be adequate. If this was not the case, and the domain was one in 
which it was less clear what particular facts, or structured 
groupings of them, were critical to the outcome of domain cases, 
then the overall similarity of facts (and relationships among them) in 
different cases would be more important, and a system like GREBE 
which could look for new similarities (or try to create differences) 
would be more appropriate. This sophistication of GREBE’S form of 
pattern matching is of course an advantage, when compared to the 
more schematic form of case matching performed by HYPO; its 
disadvantage is that it is potentially very computationally expensive, 
as Branting himself notes.73
It is probable, if the HYPO form of CBR was to be used in the expert 
system, that the factual information contained in the case profiles, 
which would be cast in the GREBE formalism at the outset, could be 
automatically examined and used to identify what HYPO factors were 
present in the CKB cases. This assertion is based on the fact that 
HYPO itself automatically infers what factual predicates (which are 
used to s a t is fy  the  p re re q u is ite s /e le m e n ts  o f its  
dimensions/factors, see section 3.5) are satisfied by a NFS, from the 
user’s description of the detailed facts of that case. Thus it can be 
assumed that, even if the factual details of each case needed to be 
reexamined in order to enable HYPO like CBR, the same set of case 
profiles (and thus the same CKB), could be used for this purpose as 
was used by the principle-cases reconciliation system, and that 
consequently it would not be necessary to scrutinise the raw 
materials again.
The case based reasoner would also note the precedential pedigree of 
the cases identified as factually analogous to the the NFS. This would 
enable the user to rank the cases it retrieved either according to 
their degree of sim ilarity with the NFS, or according to their 
precedential authority relevant to it, but it would be left to him to 
offset one against the other.
The principle based reasoner would note the procedural context of the 
NFS, in order to exclude from its reasoning any proposed principle for
Branting, L. K. Building Explanations from Rules and Structured Cases. IJMMS-1, p. 817
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which there was an unfavourable case, which could not be reconciled 
with the principle unless it was argued as having been wrongly 
decided, and which, due to the doctrine of stare decisis, the court 
hearing the NFS would not be able to overrule, even if it considered 
that the case was wrongly decided. The reasoner would then attempt 
to produce ‘arguments from princip le ’ , by identifying the most 
specific version of any usable principle contained in the PKB which 
could be advanced as subsuming the NFS. To do this it would 
generalise, in the domain hierarchy, from the facts of the NFS, to the 
legal concepts and facts contained in (versions of) the principles; and 
it would use CBR to identify the arguments for and against the NFS 
satisfying any open textured terms they contained. The versions (of 
principles) returned would have certainty factors to indicate their 
chances of success, and to reconcile conflicts, plus an explanation of 
the reasons for the individual certainty evaluations involved, plus the 
accounts of how the principles were reconciled with the domain case 
law.
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Figure 4. Diagram of the relationships between the proposed systems 
and knowledge sources.
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The principle-cases reconcilia tion system would have its own 
dedicated case based reasoner, for performing GREBE’S form of CBR, 
if it was decided that the expert system should use HYPO’s form; 
otherwise the same reasoner would be used by both systems.
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Chapter 9
Conclusions
9.1 Recapitulation
As stated at the start of this work, its main purpose has been to 
examine the extent to which one might model, computationally, part 
of a specific theory of judicial legal reasoning; as part of that 
examination I have also suggested how one might attempt to build a 
legal expert system which is rooted in that theory. From these 
considerations one might draw the the following conclusions.
9.2 The extent to which M acCorm ick’s Theory can be 
m odelled
Deductive justification can be predicted by using RBR, reasoning by 
analogy can be simulated, to an extent, by using generic rules and 
CBR. However the use of principle in legal reasoning can only be 
computationally expressed to a limited extent at present. Assessing 
the desirability of the consequences of proposed principles would 
remain a human task, and even though the person undertaking this (the 
expert) should be aware of all the constraints to which the person 
whose assessment he was trying to anticipate (the judge) was 
subject, there would remain an unavoidable element of guess work as, 
at the end of the day this assessment is, as MacCormick says,74 a t 
least in part irreducibly subjective.
Expert involvement would be required even more in a project to 
implement MacCormick’s ideas than it is for the development of 
current expert systems, and getting that partic ipation is, as 
previously stated, already a major problem. However, for the task of 
actually forming principles, and reconciling them with the case law, 
Al techniques can be of assistance, as was explained. In fact they can 
provide the tools with which the user himself can speculate as to 
new principles, as was suggested, and so if expert assistance was 
not available they could provide useful service by enabling the user to
74 LRLT, pTTil
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formulate additional arguments to consider, and put before the judge 
(if favourable), or decide how to counter (if unfavourable).
9.3 The need for Principles in any Expert System
I have suggested that three types of reasoning would need to be 
modelled in an expert system based on MacCormick’s theory. 
Reasoning with legal rules i.e. rules derived from statutes or cases, 
reasoning by analogy (using cases as descriptions of factual 
situations), and reasoning with principles (formulated as rules by the 
expert).
The two legal claims which have provided the main context in which 
the discussion of these types of reasoning has been undertaken (i.e., 
right of recovery against the seller of a defective product for harm 
suffered, and right of recovery against the manufacturer of a 
defective product for harm suffered), each rely predominantly on a 
different type of reasoning (one on reasoning with statutory and case 
based rules, one on reasoning with principles). Together they 
constitute (at least part of) a specific area of law with which one 
can imagine a lawyer having to deal on a daily basis, and in which an 
expert system could provide useful service, i.e. Consumer (or user) 
rights of recovery for harm suffered from a defective product. A 
system offering advice on just one of these claims would be of 
limited use, as the lawyer’s task is to identify and pursue all 
possible courses of action open to his client, not just those available 
against a specific party. Therefore, as a lawyer should offer 
comprehensive advice, in order to be of practical use an expert 
system operating in an area of law such as this should be able to 
reason with principles, as well as rules and by analogy.
This area of law basically describes the legal context in which 
MacCormick conducts his discussion of deductive justification, and 
the use of principles when deductive justification is not possible (i.e. 
in hard cases). He notes that appeal to principle is made in many 
areas of law when hard cases arise. However, from a practising 
lawyer’s point of view, one might suggest that investigating the 
possibility of appealing to principles should not be confined merely 
to what appear to be hard cases. Even if a deductively justifiable 
argument does appear possible (i.e. the case appears clear), one 
should s till attem pt to identify a lte rna tive , p rinc ip le  based
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arguments, as the deductive one might fail for some reason. 
Consequently it is submitted that, the above noted view, that in order 
to be of practical use an expert system in law should offer 
comprehensive advice, and therefore should be able to reason with 
general principles of law, as well as with case or statutory rules, 
and by analogy, is extendible, and can be argued as being applicable to 
expert systems in law operating in practically any area of law.
Although the likes of Smith have recognised the need for a legal 
expert system to be able to reason with principles, and through the 
UBC projects he and his researchers have proved that it is possible to 
meet that need, I do not believe any one has yet constructed a system 
capable of all three types of reasoning. However such a system cannot 
be far away. So called hybrid systems, which use the techniques of 
RBR and CBR, to implement reasoning deductively with legal rules, 
and reasoning by analogy, have already been built, e.g. GREBE, and 
CABARET; and the UBC projects use the same techniques to reason 
with principles. The attraction of combining the two types of system 
cannot have escapes notice. I believe that the development of such a 
system is the next step towards the widespread acceptance and use 
of expert systems in law.
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